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Abstract
We investigate the relationship between individual trust and individual economic
performance. We ￿nd that individual income is hump-shaped in a measure of intensity
of trust beliefs. Heterogeneity of trust beliefs in the population, coupled with the
tendency of individuals to extrapolate beliefs about others from their own levels of
trustworthiness, could generate this non-monotonic relationship: highly trustworthy
individuals tend to form overly optimistic beliefs, to assume too much social risk and
to be cheated more often, ultimately performing less well than those with a belief close
to the mean trustworthiness of the population. On the other hand, less trustworthy
individuals form overly pessimistic beliefs and avoid being cheated, but give up pro￿table
opportunities, therefore underperforming. The cost of either too much or too little trust
is comparable to the income lost by foregoing college. Our ￿ndings in large-scale survey
data are supported and extended with experimental ￿ndings. We show that in the
trust game, own trustworthiness and beliefs about others￿trustworthiness are strongly
correlated and persistent and that patterns in earnings lost due to incorrect beliefs are
comparable to those in the survey data.
JEL Classi￿cation: A1, A12, D1, O15, Z1
Keywords: Trust, trustworthiness, economic performance, culture, false
consensus
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More than 35 years ago Kenneth Arrow (1972), recognizing the pervasiveness of mutual
trust in commercial and non-commercial transactions, went so far as to state that ￿it can
be plausibly argued that much of the economic backwardness in the world can be explained
by the lack of mutual con￿dence￿(p. 357). Since then, Arrow￿ s conjecture has received
considerable empirical support. A vast literature investigates the link between aggregate
trust and aggregate economic performance and ￿nds a positive and monotonic relationship.1
However, there is no research available on the relationship between individuals￿ levels of
trust￿ beliefs held about others￿trustworthiness￿ and individuals￿economic outcomes. The
latter relationship is the focus of this paper.
Trust beliefs are very heterogeneous across individuals. Figure 1 shows the distribution
of trust for each of the countries surveyed in the European Social Survey. Here, trust is the
belief about the trustworthiness of a generic fellow countryman measured on a scale between
0 and 10: zero means no trust at all, while 10 means other people can be fully trusted.2
Since for each country beliefs refer to the average trustworthiness of the same population,
respondents cannot all be simultaneously right: some must have overly pessimistic beliefs,
while others must have beliefs that are too optimistic.3 Individuals with beliefs in the
tails of the trust distribution must either underestimate or overestimate the trustworthiness
of others and this should be re￿ ected in their economic performances: those who trust
too little will give up trade and pro￿t opportunities too often, depressing their economic
performance; conversely, individuals who trust too much will over-invest in others and get
cheated more frequently, hampering their economic outcomes. Hence, at the individual level,
the relationship between trust and economic performance is non-monotonic. There exists an
intermediate level of trust￿ the ￿right amount of trust￿ ￿ that maximizes individual income.
This amount of income, and trust, will be attained by individuals whose beliefs are closest
1Trust has been shown to be strongly correlated with GDP per capita and GDP growth (Knack and Zak
(2001); Knack and Keefer (1996); Guiso et al (2004); Tabellini (2008b); Algan and Cahuc (2010)); with the
ability of ￿rms to grow large (La Porta et. al. (1997)); with the size of a country￿ s stock market (Guiso et.
al. (2008a)); and with cross-country trading patterns (Guiso et al., 2009)).
2See Section 4 for the exact wording of the question in the European Social Survey.
3We acknowledge that some of the observed heterogeneity in trust beliefs may come from respondents
interpreting the question as asking about the trustworthiness of the pool of people with whom they gen-
erally interact, rather than asking about the general population. We show in Section 8 that a similar
dispersion of trust beliefs exists even without this potential confound in a laboratory experiment. There,
participants estimated the trustworthiness of a ￿xed and explicitly speci￿ed population￿ other experimental
participants￿ and beliefs still exhibited considerable heterogeneity.
1to the average trustworthiness in the population.
We test the relationship between trust and income using data from the European Social
Survey. Since the survey measures the intensity of individuals￿trust beliefs on a scale from
zero to 10, we can explore the relationship between individual trust and individual economic
performance, particularly at the tails of the distribution of trust beliefs.
When we regress individuals￿income on a set of dummies for the 11 di⁄erent levels
of trust we ￿nd a marked hump-shaped relationship: people with low levels of trust have
signi￿cantly lower income than those with intermediate levels of trust. Income tends to
reach a peak at a level of trust around 8, before declining rapidly for the highest levels of
trust.
The magnitude of this income variation is economically signi￿cant. On average, income
for individuals with the lowest level of trust is 14.5% lower than income at the right amount
of trust. This shortfall in income is on par with the income lost by foregoing college. At
the highest level of trust, average income falls short of peak income by 7%. Accordingly,
the cost of deviating from the right amount of trust can be substantial.
To strengthen the causal interpretation we re-estimate the relationship between indi-
vidual income and trust beliefs for low- and high-trust countries separately. In countries
with low average trustworthiness the right amount of trust is lower than in countries with
high average trustworthiness. Hence, the income-trust relationship should, ceteris paribus,
peak at lower levels of individual trust in the ￿rst group of countries than in the second.4
Consistent with this implication we ￿nd that the income-trust relationship is always hump-
shaped, but in low trust countries peaks at a lower trust level. We also show that the
hump-shaped income-trust relationship is not a re￿ ection of obvious forms of unobserved
heterogeneity. For example, we can rule out the explanation that moderate levels of trust
actually serve as a generic measure of moderate traits, which are better suited to achieve
economic success than extreme traits. Furthermore, we show that the hump-shaped income-
trust relationship does not vanish with experience, nor with education.
The European Social Survey allows us to dig deeper into one of the mechanisms through
which generalized trust a⁄ects economic performance: exposure to the risk of being cheated.
The survey asks individuals whether, over the past ￿ve years, they have been ￿cheated￿
4We assume that trust beliefs are, on average, correct so that, e.g., highly-trusting countries are also
highly-trustworthy countries.
2over four di⁄erent domains: dealing with a bank, buying goods second hand, buying food,
and dealing with a plumber, builder, mechanic or repairman. All else equal, exceedingly
trusting individuals should be cheated more often. Obscuring this relationship in the data,
however, is the fact that individuals who are cheated learn and revise their trust beliefs
downward. In this way, learning generates a negative correlation between trust and the
experience of being cheated. To isolate the causal e⁄ect of trust on the probability of being
cheated we follow two avenues. First, we adopt an instrumental variables approach and ￿nd
that those who trust more are indeed more likely to be cheated across all the domains for
which we have data.
The second avenue we follow involves detailed information on immigrants from the
European Social Survey. One strand of literature has shown that cultural norms such as
individual trustworthiness and attitudes concerning trusting others are acquired through
intergenerational transmission (Giuliano (2007); Fernandez and Fogli (2009); Guiso et. al.
(2004, 2008b), Tabellini (2008a, 2008b), Luttmer and Singhal (2010), Dohmen et. al.
(2007)) and thus persist across generations. This provides an alternative source of exo-
genous variation which we use to identify the causal e⁄ect of trust on exposure to social
risk. Under the hypothesis that trust beliefs persist￿ because, e.g., cultural norms are slow
to change and individuals extrapolate from their own type￿ immigrants from high trust
countries should be, all else equal, more likely to be cheated. Consistent with this pre-
diction, we ￿nd that immigrants from relatively high trust countries are, ceteris paribus,
cheated more often. For ￿rst generation immigrants, we ￿nd a strong positive e⁄ect of
average trust levels in the country of origin on being cheated. The second generation learns
from experience and, consequently, the impact of trust levels in the country of origin on
immigrants￿exposure to fraud vanishes.
Finally, to provide more controlled evidence on both the hump-shaped relationship
between trust and economic performance and the heterogeneity of trust beliefs we report
evidence from an experiment using the trust game (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995).
We show that own trustworthiness and expectations of others￿trustworthiness are strongly
correlated and that this correlation persists over multiple rounds of game-play. We also ￿nd
that participants￿trustworthiness, as measured by their behavior in the trust game, can be
traced back to values instilled by their parents. Finally, using a modi￿ed trust game more
closely matching our theoretical model we show that individuals who depart in either dir-
3ection from the right amount of trust earn less, and that in percentage terms their earnings
shortfalls are of the same order of magnitude as in the survey data.
Our paper contributes to two recent literatures that study how trust relates to various
dimensions of economic performance using either ￿eld data (see among others, Tabellini
(2008b); Algan and Cahuc (2010); Nunn and Wantchekon (2009); La Porta et. al. (1997);
Bloom et al (2009)) or laboratory experiments (see Camerer (2003) and the references
therein). However, while both of these literatures concentrate on how trust (or lack of it)
a⁄ects collective economic performance, we combine both methods to study how di⁄erences
in individuals￿trust beliefs result in di⁄erences in individuals￿economic outcomes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss alternative
explanations for why trust beliefs may di⁄er and persist. In Section 3 we present a simple
model that predicts a hump-shaped relationship between individual trust and performance.
In Section 4 we describe the survey data and in Section 5 we present the main results from
our estimation of the trust-performance relationship in this data. Various extensions and
robustness checks follow in Section 6. In Section 7 we estimate the e⁄ect of trust on the
frequency with which one is cheated. In section 8 we present the results from our trust
game experiments. Section 9 concludes.
2 Why are trust beliefs heterogeneous and persistent?
There are two plausible explanations for why trust beliefs di⁄er across individuals in the
same community and why these di⁄erences persist. According to one view, individuals￿be-
liefs are initially acquired through cultural transmission and then slowly updated through
experience from one generation to the next. Heterogeneity is then the result of family-
speci￿c shocks. This line of argument has been pursued by Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales
(2008b) who build an overlapping-generations model in which children absorb their trust
priors from their parents and then, after experiencing the real world, transmit their (up-
dated) beliefs to their own children. Dohmen et. al (2007) provide evidence consistent with
this view. This explains heterogeneity in initial priors and persistence across generations.
Within a generation, correlation between current beliefs and received priors is diluted as
people age and learn. Yet this dilution needs not to be complete. One mechanism gen-
erating persistence could be con￿rmation bias￿ a tendency to seek and ￿nd evidence that
4con￿rms existing beliefs and ignore or reinterpret discon￿rmatory evidence.5 Alternatively,
cultural beliefs may persist because, once hardwired, they are painful to eradicate and this
pain makes one reluctant to update them even in spite of discon￿rmatory information.6
The second plausible explanation is that parents instill values rather than beliefs in
their children. In particular, parents may teach values of trustworthiness: acting justly
even at the expense of material gains. Cultural transmission of values of cooperation and
trustworthiness is the focus of Bisin and Verdier (2000), Bisin, Topa, and Verdier (2004)
and Tabellini (2008a). They show how norms of behavior are optimally passed down from
parents to children and persist from generation to generation. Heterogeneity in parents￿
preferences and experiences may then result in heterogeneity in instilled trustworthiness.
Even if parents do not teach beliefs directly, individuals may extrapolate from their own
types when forming beliefs about others￿trustworthiness. As Thomas Schelling once wrote
￿...you can sit in your armchair and try to predict how people behave by asking yourself
how you would behave if you had your wits about you. You get free of charge a lot of
vicarious empirical behavior￿(1966, p. 150).
Through such ￿false consensus￿(Ross, Green and House (1977)), heterogeneity in values
translates into heterogeneity in beliefs. In our context false consensus implies that highly
trustworthy individuals will tend to think that others are like them and form overly optim-
istic trust beliefs, while highly untrustworthy people will extrapolate from their own types
and form excessively pessimistic beliefs. If values persist over time and false consensus does
not vanish with learning, then wrong beliefs will also persist.7 Both highly trustworthy
and highly untrustworthy individuals will tend to systematically form more extreme trust
beliefs than are warranted by their experiences.
In the next section we present a simple static model illustrating how heterogeneous trust
beliefs can imply a humped-shaped relationship between income and trust.
5A recent functional magnetic resonance imaging study shows where in the brain the con￿rmation bias
arises and how it operates unconsciously (Westen, et. al., 2006).
6Blanco (2008) provides evidence consistent with this view in the context of a trust game experiment.
She shows that senders￿trust decisions respond to their own values even when the behaviour of the receiver
is fully known.
7False consensus has been shown to be a persistent phenomenon: neither providing additional information
about the population of interest, nor warning individuals about the possibility of false conseunsus, eliminates
the e⁄ect (Krueger and Clement (1994)). Furthermore, it has been found that false consensus is not drowned
out by monetary incentives for accurate predictions (e.g. Massey and Thaler (2006)).
53 Individual trust and economic performance: a simple model
Consider an investor with an endowment E which can be invested, totally or partially, in
a venture managed by a partner. The endowment and the partnership should be inter-
preted broadly. The endowment could represent capital contributed to a project run by an
entrepreneur or money invested in a fund managed by a professional which a⁄ects income
from capital. Alternatively, E could be the time and e⁄ort (human capital) that a worker
allows his or her boss to manage in hopes of advancing more quickly along the career path
which a⁄ects labor income. Or, in a more familiar setting, E could represent ideas that a
researcher shares with co-authors on a joint project.
An amount S ￿ E invested creates surplus according to the production function f(S) >
S, of which the partner agrees to return a fraction 0 < ￿ < 1 to the investor. Partners can
be one of two types: honest or cheater. A fraction ￿ of partners are cheaters, while the rest
of the economy￿ s partners are honest. Each investor is randomly matched with a partner,
as in Dixit (2003). An honest partner returns the promised share of the surplus, ￿f(S),
while a cheater absconds with the whole surplus. We assume that f(S) is increasing and
concave (f0 > 0 and f00 < 0), and that ￿f(S) > S so that investment has a positive return if
the partner does not cheat. We also assume that (1￿￿)￿f0(0) > 1: at zero investment the
expected marginal return from investing exceeds the return from keeping the endowment
idle. Together these assumptions imply a unique, internal, optimal investment amount.
Investors also di⁄er in their intrinsic trustworthiness. Assume there is a continuum of
investors each characterized by a level of trustworthiness, p, distributed on the unit interval
[0;1]. Suppose that a fraction ￿ of investors has a level of trustworthiness p ￿ ￿: Of course,
while an investor can be cheated, investors cannot cheat. We ￿rst assume that investors
have correct beliefs and anticipate that the probability of being cheated is ￿: Given these
correct beliefs, an individual investor decides how much to invest in the venture so as to
maximize:
MaxS : Y (S) = E ￿ S + (1 ￿ ￿)￿f(S)
s:t: : S ￿ E
Let S￿
￿ denote the optimal amount invested when beliefs are correct. Then the investor￿ s
expected income is Y (S￿
￿) = E ￿ S￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿f(S￿
￿).
6Consider next the case where investors form beliefs about the trustworthiness of the
partners by extrapolating from their own types. To illustrate, suppose that the trust belief
of an individual with own-trustworthiness level p is exactly his or her own trustworthiness.
Given these (possibly incorrect) beliefs, an investor solves the problem:
MaxS : Y (S) = E ￿ S + (1 ￿ p)￿f(S)
s:t: : S ￿ E
Let S￿
p denote the optimal amount invested when beliefs about others￿trustworthiness are
extrapolated from the investor￿ s own type and let Y (S￿
p) = E ￿ S￿
p + (1 ￿ ￿)￿f(S￿
p) be the
investor￿ s average income. Notice that income realizations depend on the actual fraction of
trustworthy partners. We state the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 1: When individuals extrapolate from their own type, an
investor￿ s average income, Y (S￿
p); is a concave function of the investor￿ s trust
beliefs. This function attains its maximum when the investor￿ s belief about the
share of trustworthy partners, 1 ￿ p, equals the true share (1 ￿ ￿). Proof: see
appendix 1.
The proposition implies that both investors with very low and very high levels of trust
(and trustworthiness) do worse than those with a trust (and trustworthiness) level close
to the average trustworthiness of the population. In the ￿rst case, by under-investing
investors with very low trust levels lose little if cheated; but by retaining too much of their
endowment, they give up pro￿t opportunities￿ and the latter e⁄ect far exceeds the former.
On the other hand, investors in the second group invest a lot in the productive venture,
which can potentially raise their income. But since they grant partners more trust than they
deserve, they lose a lot when cheated and the latter e⁄ect dominates the former. Hence, the
relationship between individual economic performance and trust beliefs is hump-shaped, as
illustrated in Figure 2.
If populations di⁄er in their average degree of trustworthiness (1 ￿ ￿), then observed
individual performance, Y (S￿
p), will, ceteris paribus, be higher in high-trustworthiness coun-
tries. In our empirical analysis, we will capture these shifts with a set of country dummies
as well as ￿ner, community-level, trustworthiness controls.
Furthermore, our model makes a prediction about how the income-trust relationship
will vary across countries:
7PROPOSITION 2: The level of trust at which income attains its max-
imum is increasing in the population￿ s proportion of trustworthy people, (1￿￿).
This is a relevant prediction that can be tested empirically.8 With respect to Figure
2, the proposition states that a larger share of trustworthy individuals implies a peak in
income that occurs farther to the right.
4 Data: the European Social Survey
To study the relationship between individual performance and trust beliefs we rely on the
second wave of the European Social Survey (ESS), conducted in 2004/2005. The ESS
is a biennial cross-sectional survey administered in a large sample of mostly European
Nations. The survey has been conducted four times: in 2002/2003, 2004/2005, 2006/2007
and 2008/2009. The number of countries varies by wave.9 We use the second round because
it is the only round containing the measures of cheating crucial for our analysis. For each
country, the ESS provides information on individuals￿social values, cultural norms and
behavior patterns. Within each country, a representative sample of around 2,000 individuals
is surveyed.10 Pooling data across countries yields 47,035 observations. Because some
observations lack income data (11,128 observations) or responses to one or more explanatory
variables (7,624 observations) our ￿nal reference sample consists of 28,383 observations.
The data appendix provides details on the sample selection, the countries included and the
8There are two points to notice. First, in this simple model the channel through which trust beliefs and
individual performance are related is systematic errors in beliefs. We argue that these can be induced by false
consensus or by ingrained heterogeneous priors. Obviously, there could be other channels. For instance, high-
trust people may become targets of swindlers who can exploit na￿ve expectations of good faith. Alternatively,
highly-trusting people may be more exposed to con￿dence games even when their own attitude to trust is
not explicitly targeted. Barnard Mado⁄￿ s story can be interpreted as one where high-trust individuals were
more likely to fall prey to Mado⁄￿ s game even if they were not individually targeted. These two mechanisms
can explain why those who trust too much may under-perform. However, they cannot explain why those
who trust too little do poorly. Culturally-induced heterogeneity in beliefs or in values, together with the
tendency of individuals to extrapolate from their own types, can explain both. Second, the model implies
that in the absence of false consensus all individuals would share the same beliefs even if individuals are
actually heterogeneous. False consensus, by linking trust beliefs to own-trustworthiness, automatically gives
rise to heterogeneity in beliefs. In this context, one interpretation of false consensus is to view it as a
source of initial priors, which allows for a departure from the controversial common prior assumption. In
the absence of a history of information about the reliability of a pool of people, those interacting with an
unknown pool form a prior by asking themselves how they would behave in similar circumstances: since they
would personally behave di⁄erently, they start with di⁄erent priors. This is consistent with the evidence
shown in Section 7.
9There are 22 countries included in the ￿rst round, 26 in the second, 25 in the third and 28 in the latest.
10Sample size di⁄ers by country depending on country population and ranges from 579 in Iceland to 2870
in Germany.
8overall survey design. Besides information on core variables of interest for the purpose of
the survey, the ESS provides various measures of respondents￿demographic characteristics
and indicators of respondents￿socioeconomic status.
4.1 Measuring trust
The ESS elicits trust beliefs by asking the classical question ￿Generally speaking, would you
say that most people can be trusted, or that you can￿ t be too careful in dealing with people?￿
While in most comparable surveys (the World Values Survey, the US General Social Survey,
etc.) the trust question is binary, in the ESS respondents are asked to express the intensity
of their trust beliefs on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means no trust at all and 10 means
that most people can be fully trusted.11 It is this feature of the ESS that allows us to
investigate the relationship between individuals￿trust beliefs and economic performance,
and, in particular, to test whether the relationship is hump-shaped.
Figure 1 illustrates both the presence of a considerable number of observations at the
two tails of the distribution of trust within each country, as well as systematic di⁄erences
in the shape of the trust distribution across countries. In one group￿ the high trust North
European countries such as Norway, Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands￿ the
distribution has a fat tail on the right and the modal level of trust is quite high at around
7 or 8. Another group, which includes the Mediterranean countries and several Eastern
European countries, features a fat left tail, denoting low average trust. In a third group
consisting of several European countries (e.g., Austria, Germany, France and the UK) the
distribution is approximately symmetric around modal values of 5 or 6. Table 1 shows that
the (whole) sample mean trust level is around 5, with a standard deviation of 2.5. As we
show in Section 5, both within- and between-country variation prove critical for identifying
the predicted hump-shaped relationship between performance and trust.12
11In most comparable surveys, respondents must choose between the two options: ￿most people can be
trusted,￿or ￿you can￿ t be too careful.￿
12In the ￿nal sample used in our estimations, there are over 2,000 observations featuring a trust level of 9
or 10 and almost 4,000 with trust equal to either 1 or 0. We investigated the characteristics of individuals
reporting a very high level of trust to address the concern that there could be something peculiar about
these people, other than trust, driving their incomes down. We found no systematic di⁄erences between
these highly-trusting individuals and the rest of the sample. In particular, their education levels were not
signi￿cantly di⁄erent.
94.2 Measuring performance
The ESS is rich in many dimensions, but as with most surveys focusing on values it has
little information on individuals￿economic outcomes or other economic variables. The best
available performance indicator is a measure of total net household income, which is the
measure we use. Respondents are asked to report which income bracket, identi￿ed with a
letter, best approximates their households￿total net income. They are asked to consider
income from all sources, including labor income and income from capital and investments.
This is an important feature because, as we have argued, trust can a⁄ect all sources of
income.13 In order to facilitate answers, the question is framed in a way that accounts for
country-speci￿c conventions in the frequency of income payments. Respondents can provide
the income ￿gure using the frequency they know best: weekly, monthly or annual. Each
letter identi￿es an income bracket in euros (see appendix 2 for more details) de￿ned so
as to be consistent across di⁄erent frequencies.14 We convert all responses to their annual
equivalent. The resulting brackets range from less than 1800 euros per year to above 120,000
(the largest net income allowed). To facilitate our analysis we identify each bracket with
its mid-point. Table 1 shows summary statistics for (log) income in the sample.
5 Model speci￿cation and results
To study the relationship between individual economic performance and individual trust
we estimate the following model:
log(Yic) = ￿j￿jTrustjic + ￿Xic + ￿C + ￿R + ￿ic (1)
Here Yic is the income level of individual i in country c and Xic is a vector of individual
controls that can a⁄ect economic performance. We capture the e⁄ect of trust with a set
of 10 dummies Trust1;Trust2, ....Trust10, the excluded group being individuals reporting
the lowest possible trust level of 0. This speci￿cation allows wide ￿ exibility estimating the
relationship between trust and income, imposing no parametric assumptions. Finally, to
13While trust may a⁄ect all types of income, certain types, such as income from capital, may arguably
be more exposed to opportunistic behavior than other types (e.g., labor income) and thus more sensitive to
incorrect trust beliefs. Unfortunately, we cannot test this possibility as the ESS does not provide information
on income components.
14For instance, the ￿rst income category identi￿es income below 40 euros per week or below 150 euros per
month or below 1800 euros per year. These ￿gures are roughly equivalent if a month is made of four paid
working weeks and a year of 12 paid working months.
10control for systematic di⁄erences in average income across countries and, within countries,
across regions, we insert a vector of country ￿xed e⁄ects, C, and a vector of regional
￿xed e⁄ects, R. Among other things, these ￿xed e⁄ects capture di⁄erences in individual
performance due to systematic di⁄erences in the average level of trustworthiness across
countries and, within countries, across di⁄erent regions. The vector X includes dummies
for individuals￿educational attainment as well as dummies for respondents￿fathers￿levels
of education, which serve as proxies for acquired and inherited human capital, respectively.
The vector X also contains a linear and quadratic term in age to capture life cycle e⁄ects in
income, dummies for gender, marital and employment status, immigration status, as well
as dummies for city size with rural areas as the excluded category.
Table 2 shows the resulting estimates. We report neither country nor regional ￿xed
e⁄ects, instead showing only the F-test for their joint signi￿cance in the note at the bottom
of the table. The ￿rst column reports estimates for the whole sample, using as regressors the
set of trust dummies, other plausible determinants of income that may also be correlated
with trust (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002) as well as country and region ￿xed e⁄ects. The
income-trust relationship is increasing for low levels of trust, before leveling o⁄and peaking
at a trust level of 8. Beyond a trust level of 8 income declines. The decline is initially small.
However, income falls precipitously moving trust level 9 to the highest trust level. This
concave pattern is evident in Figure 3 and is fully consistent with our model￿ s predictions
(Section 3). Most of the other controls have e⁄ects consistent with our priors: income
increases with own and father￿ s education; it is hump-shaped in age; it is higher for males
and for married or single people (compared to those who are divorced or widow(er)s).
Income is lower for the unemployed, for those out of the labor force and for immigrants.
Concerning the magnitude of the e⁄ect of trust beliefs on income, those with the lowest
level of trust have an income that is 14.5 percent lower than income at the peak, a decrease
of the same order of magnitude as the increase (15.7 per cent) associated with obtaining a
college degree. Those who express the highest level of trust (10) make an income that is
7.3 percent lower than peak income. Both of these di⁄erences are statistically signi￿cant,
as the t-tests at the bottom of the table show. Thus, departing from the right amount of
trust, either because one trusts too much or because one trusts too little can be individually
very costly.
In our estimates we are interpreting measured trust as picking up only individual beliefs
11about others￿trustworthiness. There is a still-unsettled debate over whether questions such
as those asked by the ESS or the World Values Survey re￿ ect expected trustworthiness only,
or re￿ ect a mix of beliefs and individual preferences (see Miller and Mitamura (2003)). For
instance, Fehr (2009) points out that answers to trust questions like those asked in the ESS
likely re￿ ect not only individuals￿beliefs about others￿trustworthiness, but also individuals￿
preferences towards risk, and in particular towards social risk.15 Alternatively, it has been
argued (Cox, 2004) that trust may re￿ ect pure altruistic preferences in addition to beliefs
about others￿trustworthiness, so that for given beliefs more altruistic individuals would
exhibit more trust. This would be the case, for example, when trust is measured as the act
of sending money in standard trust games, but could also be re￿ ected in survey measures
of trust if individuals respond by mimicking what they would do in an experiment. In
Section 8 we more fully address these issues using evidence from a trust game experiment
that allows us to separate beliefs from preferences. Here, to account for these possibilities
we add a control for risk preferences (column 2), as well as a proxy for altruism (column 3).
Our measures rely on questions eliciting attitudes on various domains by asking participants
how a certain description applies to them. Respondents were asked the following question:
￿I will brie￿ y describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me how
much each person is or is not like you.￿ To obtain an indicator of risk attitudes we use
the following description: ￿She/he looks for adventures and likes to take risks. She/he
wants to have an exciting life.￿ To obtain an indicator of altruism we rely on the following
description: ￿It is important to her/him to be loyal to her/his friends. She/he wants to
devote herself/himself to people close to her/him.￿ 16
For these questions, respondents provide answers between 1 and 6, with 1 meaning ￿very
much like me,￿6 meaning ￿Not like me at all￿and values in between re￿ ecting intermediate
similarity. Thus higher values of the risk preference indicator signal high risk aversion and
higher values of the altruistic preferences measure mean less altruism. In all of the analysis
that follows, we re-order responses to these questions so that higher values indicate higher
risk tolerance and more altruism, respectively.
15Glaeser et. al. (2000) argue that WVS questions are better measures of trustworthiness than of trust
beliefs as they correlate poorly with amounts sent in a trust game. Sapienza et. al (2007) argue tha this is
due to behavioral trust measuring both beliefs and preferences. They conduct a trust game where subjects
report expected trustworthiness and are also asked the standard WVS generalized trust question. They ￿nd
that a sender￿ s expectations of others trustworthiness is highly correlated with the trust question in the
WVS, suggesting that the latter is a good measure of the belief component of trust.
16Two other measures of altruistic preferences from questions in the survey provide very similar results
12Risk tolerance is positively and signi￿cantly correlated with income while measures of
altruism are in general negatively correlated. However, when we control for these preference
measures, and thus net out the trust measure from their in￿ uence, our results are una⁄ected.
This suggests that the trust-performance relationship is not merely an artifact of trust
serving as a proxy for risk preferences or altruism.
Finally, in the last column we replace the set of trust dummies with a linear and quad-
ratic term in the trust variable. This parametric speci￿cation allows a direct test of concav-
ity. Consistent with the previous evidence, the linear term is positive and signi￿cant, while
the quadratic term is negative and signi￿cant. Using the estimated parameters, the max-
imum level of income is obtained when trust is equal to 7.5, con￿rming the hump-shaped
relationship.
5.1 In medio stat virtus: unobserved heterogeneity
One concern with the estimates in Table 2 is that the trust measure may be capturing a
general tendency of individuals with moderate attitudes (e.g., moderate risk aversion or
moderate generosity) to succeed economically. For instance, it may be that people who
are too generous or too stingy make less income than moderately generous people, and
moderation itself is an individual characteristic also re￿ ected in moderate levels of trust.
After all, Aristotle a few millennia ago theorized that those who live a balanced life and
avoid excess can achieve happiness. This balance, he taught, varies among di⁄erent persons
and situations, and exists as a golden mean between two vices￿ one an excess and one a
de￿ciency.
In Table 2 we controlled for a variety of traits, but the e⁄ect of these traits on income was
assumed to be linear. To deal with the possibility that these variables have, themselves, a
hump-shaped e⁄ect captured by trust, we include in Table 3 a full set of dummies (excluding
the lowest category) for each of the traits considered. This allows extreme attitudes to a⁄ect
income non-monotonically. In addition, we expand the set of traits to include a measure
of religiosity on a 0-10 scale (ranging from ￿not religious at all￿to ￿very religious￿ ) and
an index of political ideology (also on a 0-10 scale, from far left to far right) as measures
of moderation. In all cases we ￿nd that the concavity of income in trust is statistically
robust to this re-speci￿cation. Furthermore, except for political opinions, income is not
hump-shaped in these traits.
135.2 Reverse Causality
Another, perhaps more serious, concern when looking at the correlation between individual
income and trust is that it may be income causing patterns in trust rather than the other
way around, as we are arguing. For instance, high income people may be more prone to
trust others if they tend to accumulate more social relations, as in Glaeser (2000), and
social relations enhance trust. Insofar as this reverse causality argument is true, the rising
portion of the trust-performance relationship we document may re￿ ect it; however it cannot
explain the declining part of the relationship. Similarly, if for whatever reason high income
causes lower trust, then reverse causality could explain the falling part of the relationship
but not its rising portion. Hence reverse causality, even if present, cannot be the full driver
of the relationship; on the other hand, culture-driven diversity in trust beliefs is able to
explain both the rising and the falling parts. Indeed, identi￿cation of the e⁄ect of trust on
individual performance occurs through the non-linearity of the predicted relationship.
To dig deeper into the reverse causality mechanism, we exploit our model￿ s implication
that income should peak at di⁄erent levels of trust in populations with di⁄erent average
trustworthiness levels (Section 3, Proposition 2). Since we do not directly observe trust-
worthiness, we obtain a measure of a country￿ s average level of trustworthiness by taking
averages of the levels of trust of the individuals in that country. If people actually extra-
polate trust beliefs from their own trustworthiness￿ as in our model in Section 3￿ then the
average belief is a good measure of average trustworthiness.
In Table 4 we report results of our basic model when we distinguish between below-
median, above-median and median trust countries (￿rst two columns), or when we estimate
the model separately for countries with a fat tail to the right (the high-trust countries)
and a fat tail to the left (the low trust countries) on the basis of Figure 1.17 As Table 4
and, even more clearly, Figure 4, show, in countries with below-median trust income peaks
at a trust level of 7; on the other hand it does not reach its peak until trust equals 9 in
above-median trust countries. Consistent with our model￿ s causal mechanism, trusting a lot
can be particularly harmful in countries where the share of untrustworthy people is large.
In these countries, fully trusting others reduces income by 10 percentage points compared
17We de￿ne high trust countries those with fat tails to the right (Switzerland, Denmark, Finland, Iceland,
Netherland, Sweden and Norway). We de￿ne low trust countries those with fat tail to the left (Greece, Italy,
Portugal, Turkey, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovania and Slovakia).
14to the peak. In contrast, the analogous loss of income is only 4.6 percentage points in
high-trust countries.
The evidence so far lends credence to the idea that reverse causality is not the primary
driver of our results. Section 8 below￿ the experimental part of the paper, in which income
is exogenously given to subjects￿ further helps to rule out this possibility.
6 Extensions and robustness checks
In this section we extend our results and test their robustness to a variety of speci￿ca-
tions and additional controls.18 First, if the concave relationship between individual trust
and performance re￿ ects the tendency to extrapolate beliefs from one￿ s own type, an obvi-
ous question is whether this impacts all groups equally or whether there are some groups
that are more prone to it. The literature maintains that false consensus is persistent and
universal. Hence, it should not vanish with experience and should not disappear among in-
dividuals with high cognitive ability. In our context, these two properties suggest that the
trust-performance relationship should retain its humped shape when we group individuals
according to experience or ability. Therefore, we re-estimate our model distinguishing ￿rst
between ￿young￿and ￿old￿(individuals below age 45 and above, respectively) using age
as a proxy for experience; and second, between high and low education (more or less than
a secondary education, respectively) as a proxy for cognitive ability. Neither of these two
distinctions makes a qualitative di⁄erence: the trust-performance relationship is as concave
among the ￿young￿as it is among the ￿old,￿and equally concave among those with a low
level of education as it is among those with a high level of education. This is apparent in
Figure 5.19
Second, one may argue that the concavity in the relationship between trust and income
is the result of systematic variation in the dispersion of trust beliefs with income. To be
clear, suppose that individuals can collect costly information about the probability that
their counterparts are trustworthy. Wealthier people can a⁄ord to pay for more informative
signals about their trading partners and therefore have more precise assessments of their
trustworthiness. If true, this implies that wealthy people have similar trust beliefs concen-
trated around the population￿ s true trustworthiness; the middle class would have beliefs
18To save space, we report regression estimates from this section in appendix 4.
19Regression results are reported in Table A1
15that are correct on average but somewhat less precise; while the poor would also have be-
liefs that are correct on average but even more di⁄use. Though no systematic relationship
would exist between trust beliefs and income, heterogeneity in belief precision could mech-
anically imply a hump-shaped relationship between trust and economic performance. This
di⁄erence in incentives to collect information has, however, another implication: dispersion
in trust beliefs should be inversely related to income. To check whether this mechanism is
driving our results, we computed for each country the relationship between the standard
deviation of trust beliefs and income. The predicted negative relationship is not in the data
(Fig. 1A, Appendix 4).
Third, while we have focused on the e⁄ect of trust on income, one may wonder whether
our estimates are not also re￿ ecting an e⁄ect of trustworthiness on income. In our model
trustworthiness a⁄ects income only because it a⁄ects trust beliefs through false consensus.
But trustworthiness may pay o⁄ directly, e.g., because trustworthy people are delegated
more responsibility and this is remunerated. Thus, one concern is that the hump-shaped
relationship could be driven by trustworthiness and not trust. To check this possibility we
add to our basic income regressions a quadratic speci￿cation for several proxies of trustwor-
thiness (Table A2). Trustworthiness is proxied in two ways: i) using self-reported cheating
behavior in the past 5 years;20 and ii) using an index of how much delegation a worker is
granted in the workplace.21 While trustworthiness tends to a⁄ect income (monotonically)
positively, the relationship between trust beliefs and income remains unaltered.22
Finally, to test whether the hump-shaped e⁄ect of trust on income is robust to the
inclusion of an even larger set of controls than already considered, we ran a set of richer
speci￿cations. To our standard regressions we added a full set of education dummies and
interactions with each country in the sample, and measures of mothers￿and partners￿edu-
cation as well as the number of people living at home. The concavity of the trust-income
relationship remained una⁄ected as did the trust dummy coe¢ cients (Table A3).
20Speci￿cally: how often the person kept the change from a shop assistant/waiter when given too much;
whether he paid cash with no receipt to avoid VAT or tax; sold something second-hand and concealed its
fault; misused or altered card/document to pretend to be eligigle; made an exaggeration or false insurance
claim; o⁄ered a favour/bribe to a public o¢ cial in exchange of his service; falsely claim government bene￿ts)
21The variable, called ￿trustworthiness￿in the table, is described in detail in Section 7.2.
22Note that three measures of trustworthiness have a negative impact on income. Those measures are the
ones indicating whether the respondent kept change from a shop assistant or waiter, or whether they made
a false insurance claim or whether they falsely claimed government bene￿ts. This is possibly due to these
measures being an indication of honesty rather than trustworthiness, and there being an explicit monetary
prize associated with dishonesty.
167 Trust and cheating
Two sources of suboptimal behavior contribute to the concavity of income in trust. On
one hand, too little trust worsens performance through overly-cautious decision making
that leads to missed pro￿t opportunities. On the other hand, too much trust undermines
performance by increasing the chances of being cheated and, conditional on being cheated,
exposing individuals to larger losses. The ￿rst channel implies that the chances of missing
pro￿table opportunities are smaller for those who trust more; the second channel implies
that the chances of being cheated are increasing in trust. Providing evidence on the ￿rst
channel is problematic because missed opportunities are typically unobservable. However,
because we have information on how often individuals have been cheated along various
domains we can test the second channel.
7.1 Measuring cheating experience
The ESS reports information on how often respondents have been cheated within the ￿ve
years prior to the interview along four dimensions: being cheated by a bank/insurance
company; a plumber, builder, car mechanic or other repair person; a seller of second hand
goods; or a grocer or food seller. Speci￿cally, the ESS asks participants:
￿How often, if ever, have each of these things happened to you in the last ￿ve years?￿
1. A bank or insurance company failed to o⁄er you the best deal you were entitled to.
2. You were sold something second-hand that quickly proved to be faulty.
3. You were sold food that was packed to conceal the worse bits.
4. A plumber, builder, car mechanic or other repair person overcharged you or did un-
necessary work.
Respondents could answer in one of 5 ways￿ never, once, twice, 3 or 4 times or, ￿nally,
5 times or more￿ which we code with the numbers 0 to 4. Figure 6 shows histograms of
the answers to each of the four cheating dimensions for the pooled data. Not surprisingly,
in all cases there is a spike at ￿Never,￿so that the vast majority of respondents report not
having been cheated. However, a non-negligible proportion of people￿ ranging from 22%
in the case of the purchase of second-hand goods to over 40% for food purchases￿ report
17having been cheated at least once. Furthermore, quite a few people report being cheated
more than once, but the frequency with which people report being cheated decays rapidly
in all domains except food, where close to 10% of respondents report being cheated 5 times
or more.
In addition to analyzing the frequency with which individuals are cheated in each of the
four domains, we also construct two summary indicators: the number of times an individual
has been cheated over the four domains collectively, and a variable extracting the ￿rst
principal component of the four cheating indicators. Summary statistics are reported in
Table 1.
7.2 Empirical speci￿cation
To test whether the chances of being cheated increase with trust we estimate the following
model:
Zd
ic = ￿Trustic + ￿Xic + ￿C + ￿R + ￿ic (2)
where Zd
ic is an indicator of how often individual i has been cheated in country C in the
domain d (cheated by a bank; or when buying food; or by a car repairer; or when buying
goods second hand). The other variables have the same meaning as in (2), but in this
speci￿cation trust is a single variable taking values from 0 to 10.23 We control for income
to capture di⁄erences in the number of transactions people engage in for a given level of
trust. In addition, to address the concern that trust is simply a proxy for risk attitudes, we
add the survey measure of risk tolerance as a control.
Moreover, we insert into this regression a full set of country and region dummies to
account for national and intra-national di⁄erences in the fraction of cheaters, and to absorb
any location-speci￿c characteristics that may encourage or discourage cheating.24 Hetero-
geneous cultural priors or heterogeneity in trustworthiness coupled with false consensus
generates dispersion in trust beliefs across individuals around these location-speci￿c means,
exposing them di⁄erentially to the possibility of being cheated. These di⁄erential e⁄ects
are what our regression will be capturing.
Before showing the estimates of (2) we have to confront an identi￿cation issue. Since
23We use a single trust measure rather than a set of dummies because we are going to instrument trust.
Furthermore, in principle being cheated should increase monotonically with trust.
24These ￿xed e⁄ects also take care of any variation across countries and regions in what is considered to
be cheating, and that may result in di⁄erent frequencies of reported cheating across countries and regions.
18people learn from experience and revise their priors accordingly, those who have been
cheated are more likely to revise their trust beliefs downwards. Because we observe the
level of trust after they have been cheated, this tends to generate a negative correlation
between cheating and trust. When we run OLS estimates of (2) for the various domains we
indeed ￿nd that this negative correlation is predominant (Appendix, Table A4).
To address this reverse causality issue, ideally we would need to observe the level of trust
before people were cheated, which we do not. An alternative is to instrument current trust
levels with variables that systematically a⁄ect an individual￿ s propensity to trust others,
but are unlikely to respond to shocks in being cheated. Since current trust depends on
individuals￿initial trust and on the experience of being cheated, if we can ￿nd variables
that are correlated with initial trust we can identify the e⁄ect of trust on being cheated.
To obtain this exogenous source of variation we follow two strategies. First, in this
subsection we use proxies for individual trustworthiness as instruments for trust as sugges-
ted by false consensus and supported by the experimental evidence provided in Section 8.
Second, in the next subsection we use variation across immigrants in the average trust levels
prevailing in their countries of origin.
Our instrument is a measure of how much responsibility is delegated to individuals by
their supervisors at work. Speci￿cally, the ESS asks individuals to state, on a scale from
zero to 10, how much latitude their manager grants them along three di⁄erent dimensions:
a) freedom in organizing their daily work; b) power to in￿ uence policy decisions about the
activities of the organization; and c) freedom to choose or change the pace of their work.25
We average the answers from the three parts of the delegation question to construct a
single measure of how much authority individuals￿managers grant them on the job. Since
more trustworthy individuals are more likely, ceteris paribus, to be delegated more power and
freedom of choice, we use this variable as a proxy for individuals￿intrinsic trustworthiness.
If individuals indeed extrapolate from their own type when forming trust beliefs, this index
should have predictive power on measured trust. To be a valid instrument we also require
that workplace delegation has no direct e⁄ect on individuals￿risk of being cheated in the
domains we observe. We see no obvious reason why such delegation would directly a⁄ect
the chances that a person is cheated by, e.g., a mechanic or a plumber. Similarly, we do not
25The exact wording is: ￿Please say how much the management at your work allows/allowed you: a) ...
to decide how your own daily work is/was organised; b) ... to in￿ uence policy decisions about the activities
of the organisation; c) ... to choose or change your pace of work￿
19see how shocks to how frequently a person is cheated in his private life￿ which is private
information and thus unobservable to the manager￿ could a⁄ect the amount of delegation
a manager grants this person on the job. The only reason why there could be a correlation
with the residuals in the cheating regression is because there could be an uncontrolled-for
individual characteristic making it obvious to an outsider that the individual is susceptible
to being cheated which would also reduce delegation to this individual. If this were the case,
the IV estimates would be inconsistent. However, the inconsistency would take the form of
a downwardly biased estimate of the true e⁄ect of trust on the frequency of being cheated.
Since, as we will see, the IV estimates suggest a positive e⁄ect, this should be taken as a
lower bound of the true e⁄ect of trust on the risk of being cheated.
Table 5 shows the ￿rst stage regression, focusing on the excluded instruments. Con-
sistent with our identi￿cation strategy the instrument has a positive e⁄ect on the level of
individual trust and is highly statistically signi￿cant.
Table 6 shows the results of the IV estimates. The ￿rst four columns report results
for each of the four domains. In all cases, the negative e⁄ect of trust beliefs in the OLS
estimates is reversed by the IV estimates, and a positive e⁄ect of trust on the number of
times an individual has been cheated results. Economically, the e⁄ect of trust on exposure
to cheating is substantial. Increasing trust by one standard deviation raises the number
of times one is cheated by a bank by 1.5 (3 times the sample mean); the frequency of
being cheated when buying second hand goods by 0.24 (62% of the sample mean); the
frequency of being cheated when buying food by 1.3 (a bit more than the sample mean);
and increases how frequently one is cheated by a plumber or repairer by 0.98 (1.7 times
the sample mean). The remaining two columns show estimates using as the dependent
variable the total number of times an individual was cheated on any domain (column 5)
and the principal component of the measure of being cheated (column 6). In all cases the
IV estimate shows a positive and highly signi￿cant e⁄ect of trust beliefs on being cheated.
The reduced form estimates of the e⁄ect of delegation (Table A5) imply that the e⁄ect
of delegation on the number of times one is cheated is close to that implied by the ￿rst
and the second stage of the IV estimates, lending indirect support to the validity of this
instrument.
Overall, these estimates imply a large e⁄ect of trust on exposure to cheating. This is con-
sistent with the idea that mistrust shields individuals from the risk of being cheated, while
20too much trust ampli￿es this risk and hinders individual economic performance, lending
support to one of the mechanisms through which heterogeneity in trust beliefs can produce
a hump-shaped relationship between trust and income.
7.3 Immigrants, persistence and learning
The second strategy we use to identify the e⁄ect of heterogeneous trust beliefs on exposure to
the social risk of being cheated exploits heterogeneity in values and beliefs among immigrants
in a given country. The latter variation also allows us to provide evidence about how
persistent (￿wrong￿ ) trust beliefs are.
We use information in the ESS about respondents￿country of origin as well as variation
in average trust across countries. The recent literature on culture and economics shows
that movers from one country to another tend to carry with them their cultural beliefs and
norms (Giuliano (2007); Fernandez and Fogli (2009); Guiso et. al. (2006)) which they then
transmit to their progeny in the new environment. Thus, either because priors instilled by
parents are slow to change or because inherited norms and values, themselves, are slow to
change, the cultural beliefs and norms prevailing in immigrants￿countries of origin continue
to shape their beliefs. Consequently, people from high trust countries should be more
exposed to the risk of being cheated than people from low trust countries. Hence we can
use heterogeneity in average trust in immigrants￿countries of origin to identify the e⁄ect of
beliefs on social risk. Since the level of trust in their country of origin is given, and cannot
be a⁄ected by immigrants￿experiences of being cheated, we can exclude reverse causality
due to learning. In e⁄ect, the average level of trust in an immigrant￿ s country of origin is
a good measure of his or her initial trust prior.26
Of course, if there is learning the e⁄ect of the initial priors may fade away and disappear
as the years in the new environment accumulate; or the e⁄ect of initial priors may be strong
in the current generation, but fade in subsequent generations who grow up and learn in
the new environment. Hence, by distinguishing between recent immigrants and immigrants
26The following story reported by Bhajan Grewal makes this point clearly. Several immigrants from
Punjab, India worked in North Queensland, Australia, in sugarcane ￿elds in the latter part of the 19th
century. One of them￿ Mr Singh￿ was saving his earnings but keeping the money under the mattress. The
Italian farmer took Mr Singh to Cairns, the largest regional town nearby and suggested to him to deposit
his capital in a bank, which he did, reluctantly, because he had no experience with banks back home in India
and because he did not trust the white fellas. After spending a few days with great unease, Singh went
back to Cairns. When in town, he went into the bank, requested to withdraw his entire account balance,
counted it carefully and deposited it all back after satisfying himself that the money was all there! The story
illustrates very well the cultural in￿ uences on immigrants priors, especially on the ￿rst generation.
21who arrived further in the past we can also shed light on how persistent trust mistakes (and
false consensus) may be in reality.
To verify the persistence of the e⁄ects of initial trust beliefs, we restrict attention to
the subsample of the ESS comprised only of ￿rst or second generation immigrants￿ leaving
us with a sample of about 4,300 individuals. To each individual we associate the average
level of trust in their country of origin (if ￿rst generation) or the average level of trust in
their parents￿country of origin (if second generation). We then regress the number of times
individuals have been cheated along our four domains on the average trust in the country of
origin interacted with indicators for ￿rst- and second-generation immigrants and the usual
controls, as well as dummies for ￿rst and second generation.
Table 7 shows the estimates. Trust in the country of origin has a positive, large and
signi￿cant e⁄ect on the number of times a ￿rst-generation immigrant is cheated by a bank,
by a plumber or repairer, or when buying food. Trust of origin is also positively related to
how frequently individuals are cheated when purchasing second hand goods, but the e⁄ect
is estimated with a large standard error.
When we use our aggregate measures of exposure to cheating (last two columns), the
e⁄ect of trust in the country of origin for ￿rst-generation immigrants is always positive
and signi￿cant. Overall, this evidence suggests that ￿rst-generation immigrants who move
from high-trust countries are more likely to be victims of cheating than ￿rst-generation
immigrants who move from low-trust countries. This is consistent with cultural priors
exerting a life-long e⁄ect, perhaps because of false consensus.
In the second row we test whether the average level of trust in the country of ancestors￿
origins still a⁄ects second-generation immigrants. We ￿nd no evidence that this is the case.
For second-generation immigrants, average trust levels in the country of their ancestors￿
origins have no e⁄ect on the number of times one is cheated in any of the speci￿cations
considered, nor in any cheating domains for which we have data.
The ESS also contains information on the number of years a person has been in the
country, allowing us to further investigate whether the e⁄ect of trust on the frequency of
being cheated attenuates as knowledge of the new environment is accumulated through
experience. For this we focus on ￿rst-generation immigrants (about 2,000 observations)
divided into two types: i) the newly-arrived (in the country for less than 20 years); and ii)
￿old arrivals￿(in the country for at least 20 years). We interact the average trust level in
22the country of origin with an indicator for an immigrant￿ s type. The estimates, reported
in Table 8, show a large and signi￿cant e⁄ect of trust in the country of origin on the
frequency with which newly-arrived immigrants are cheated by banks, by plumbers and by
mechanics. The e⁄ect is still positive and sizable for the number of times the newly-arrived
are cheated when buying goods second hand or when buying food, but the coe¢ cients are
not signi￿cant.27 The e⁄ect is still positive across all domains for old arrivals, but typically
smaller and never statistically signi￿cant.
All in all, this evidence shows that exogenous variation in beliefs about others￿trust-
worthiness a⁄ects individuals￿exposure to social risk. These e⁄ects can be quite persistent,
as di⁄erences in priors that results from a tendency to extrapolate from received norms of
trustworthiness can exert their e⁄ects for as long as 20 years.
8 Values, false consensus and heterogeneous trust beliefs
In this section we provide evidence of heterogeneity and persistence in trust beliefs, as
well as a link to cultural norms through false consensus, in the context of a trust game
(Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995)) experiment. We also document the hump-shaped
relationship between performance and beliefs in this more controlled context.
There are two reasons why it is important to document heterogeneity in beliefs in the
context of a trust game experiment. First, it has been argued that trust questions of the
sort asked in the ESS may measure not only individuals￿expectations about others￿trust-
worthiness, but also their preferences for risk and betrayal aversion (Fehr, 2009; Miller and
Mitamura, 2003) or unconditional kindness (Ashraf et al., 2006). Hence, the heterogeneity
in Figure 1 may be due to heterogeneity in preferences rather than heterogeneity in beliefs.
For this reason, and in spite of our e⁄orts to take preferences into account, one may be
skeptical about the evidence in Section 5. In a trust game experiment we can elicit beliefs
directly, allowing us to separate them from preferences. Second, one may suspect that the
heterogeneity in trust shown in Figure 1 may be a re￿ ection of heterogeneity in the pool
27One interpretation is that on goods that are traded more frequently and for which feedback on quality is
faster￿ such as food or durables￿ learning is quicker and trust in the country of origin stops mattering earlier.
On the other hand, learning may be slow for goods that are traded less frequently, such as repair services
or ￿nancial services, and for which feedback on the quality of the service may be obtained infrequently and
ambiguously. After all, investors in Mado⁄￿ s fund only discovered that they were cheated because of the
￿nancial crisis, and we get to know of a dishonest mechanic only after several trials, when chance can be
ruled out.
23of people respondents have in mind when answering the trust question. For instance, if
respondents interpret the survey trust question as asking about the pool of people with
whom they generally interact￿ who may well di⁄er in their actual trustworthiness￿ then
heterogeneity in responses to the trust question is not evidence about errors in trust be-
liefs. Everyone could simultaneously hold di⁄erent, and correct, beliefs. Since our model is
predicated on the e⁄ects of errors in trust beliefs, it would be helpful to document wide-
spread heterogeneity in trust beliefs when individuals are asked to estimate the average
trustworthiness of an unambiguously common population. We do this in the lab by eli-
citing participants￿beliefs about the trustworthiness of a well-de￿ned set of people: other
experimental participants.
8.1 The trust game experiment
For details of the experimental design, see Appendix 3. Here, we discuss the features
necessary to understand the results.
Participants were undergraduates at LUISS Guido Carli University in Rome, Italy. Eight
sessions were conducted, involving about 16 participants each, for a total sample of 124
participants.
Participants all played the trust game, which is a two-player sequential moves game of
perfect information involving two roles: sender and receiver. Senders are endowed with
10.50 euros, while receivers have no endowment. Senders move ￿rst and decide whether
to send some, all or none of their endowment to their receiver. Sending a positive amount
entails a small fee of 0.50 euros and, after paying this fee, senders can send any positive
whole-euro amount.28 Each euro sent is tripled by the experimenter before being allocated
to the receiver, who then decides whether to return some, all or none of this tripled amount
to the sender.
We collected receivers￿ actions using the strategy method: before discovering their
co-players￿actions, receivers stated how much they would return for each amount they
could possibly receive. Since there are ten possible amounts receivers can receive￿ 3(=
28There are two slight departures here from the most-standard trust game (i.e., from the game in Berg,
Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995). The ￿rst is the investment fee: the standard trust game does not involve an
investment fee. The second is that our receivers receive no endowment, whereas in the standard trust game
receivers￿endowments are equal to senders￿endowments. Neither departure changes the strategic nature
of the game. For example, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium with standard (sel￿sh) preferences still
involves the sender sending nothing.
241￿3);:::;30(= 10￿3)￿ we collect a vector of ten actions for each receiver.29 The amount
the sender sends, together with the relevant element from the receiver￿ s strategy vector,
determines the outcome of the trust game.
Since receivers could return any amount, including 0, returning a positive amount in-
volves trustworthiness. We elicit all participants￿beliefs about this measure of trustwor-
thiness in an incentive compatible manner and use them to construct a measure of trust
beliefs independent from preferences.30 Speci￿cally, each participant estimated how much
receivers would, on average, return for each amount receivers could receive, yielding 10
separate estimates per participant.31 More accurate estimates were more highly remuner-
ated, with perfect estimates paying 1 euro each. To construct a unidimensional measure of
trust beliefs for each participant, we converted each of the 10 elements of his or her belief
vector into percentage terms (0 to 1) and then took the average of these ten percentages.
For example, suppose a participant￿ s belief vector is (1;2;:::;10)￿ i.e., they believe that
receivers will on average return 1 if they receive 3 ￿ 1 = 3, 2 if they receive 3 ￿ 2 = 6, etc.




30) and then average the elements to get 1
3, or 0:33, as the participant￿ s
unidimensional trust belief.
To get a unidimensional measure of trustworthiness, for each receiver we apply the same
procedures to their willingness-to-return vector. Consequently, we have a unidimensional
trust belief measure for all participants, and a unidimensional trustworthiness measure for
half of the participants for each round of game-play.
To study persistence of the relationship between trust beliefs and own trustworthiness,
within each session the trust game was repeated for (up to) 12 rounds, with beliefs being
elicited each round. To mitigate any nuisance dynamic e⁄ects such as reputation build-
ing, before each round subjects were anonymously and randomly re-paired and roles were
randomly re-assigned within each pair. Furthermore, at the end of the experiment only
one round of game-play was (randomly) chosen to count, with subjects being paid accord-
ing to their decisions and beliefs in the chosen round only. This procedure eliminates the
29Precisely: how much a receiver will return if they receive 3 euros; ...; how much a receive will return if
they receive 30 euros.
30Individuals currently playing receiver were asked to exclude their own actions from the estimation and
are payed for accuracy on this basis as well: i.e., when computing how accurate receivers￿beliefs are, each
receiver￿ s own action is excluded from the calculation.
31Each partcipant was asked 10 questions: ￿how much, on average, will recievers return if they receive 3
euros?￿ ; ...; ￿how much, on average, will recievers return if they receive 30 euros?￿
25possibility of wealth e⁄ects across rounds and is standard in the literature.
As a measure of ￿initial￿trustworthiness mostly untainted by learning, we assign to each
individual their unidimensional trustworthiness measure from the ￿rst time they played
receiver, provided this occurred in one of the ￿rst two rounds.32 Since roles are randomly
re-assigned each round, this measure is de￿ned for a large majority of participants, but not
all of them (92 of 124).
Finally, all participants ￿lled out a brief survey. The survey was sent (e-mailed) several
days removed from laboratory sessions￿ a week before or after the participant￿ s session￿
to mitigate concerns that participants￿survey responses could systematically a⁄ect their
decisions in the lab. As part of the survey, respondents were asked to report, on a scale from
0 to 10, how much emphasis their parents placed on a number of principles and behavioral
rules during their upbringing (frugality, prudence, loyalty, etc.).33 We use answers to (some
of) these questions to construct a measure of the strength of received cultural values and
norms of trustworthiness for each participant.
Heterogeneity Figure 7 shows the distribution of (unidimensional) trust beliefs in the
￿rst round of the trust game, when no learning about the trustworthiness of the pool of
participants had yet been possible (panel A) and of our behavioral measure of own ini-
tial trustworthiness (panel B). Since trust beliefs and trustworthiness are measured by the
average share that participants expect receivers will send back, and by the average share
that receivers are willing to send back, respectively, these variables take values between
0 and 1. As these measures are continuous variables we report kernel density estimates.
The ￿gure documents considerable heterogeneity in trust priors, con￿rming the evidence in
Figure 1. Since beliefs in the experiment refer to a common pool of people, heterogeneity
in trust beliefs cannot be automatically ascribed to variation in the pools of people whose
trustworthiness is being estimated.34 Furthermore, since beliefs are measured independ-
ently of behavior, the heterogeneity in Figure 7, panel A, cannot re￿ ect di⁄erences in risk
32The choice of the ￿rst two rounds balances concerns of contamination by learning which suggest only
including those who were receivers in the ￿rst round￿ and leaving the measure unde￿ned for half of the
participants￿ against concerns about sample size which suggest extending the de￿nition to include as many
rounds as possible. In the end, we believe our de￿nition is reasonable.
33A wide array of questions was asked, some completely irrelevant to trust and trustworthiness, in order
to mitigate experimenter/demand e⁄ect in the survey answers and in the experiment.
34It is true that the Figure 7, panel A, reports beliefs for all sessions pooled, so some people might still
question the source of heterogeneity. However, plotting the trust belief densities for each session separately
(not reported, but available upon request) also yields quite a lot of heterogeneity.
26attitudes.35 In the sample the average level of trust beliefs is 0.27.36 The standard deviation
of trust beliefs is 0.16.
The ￿gure also documents substantial heterogeneity in behavioral trustworthiness, whose
sample mean and standard deviation are 0.32 and 0.16, respectively. In the next section we
test whether heterogeneity in trustworthiness is re￿ ected in heterogeneous beliefs.
False consensus and persistence Table 9, panel A, shows regressions of trust beliefs in
various rounds on own initial trustworthiness. To isolate, as best as possible, trustworthiness
as an individual trait, we use initial trustworthiness as a regressor. To reduce sampling
variation due to small sample size we aggregate observations over blocks of three rounds.
As the ￿rst column shows, in early rounds initial trustworthiness is strongly positively
correlated with trust beliefs, lending support to the idea that individuals form beliefs about
others￿ trustworthiness by extrapolating from their own types. Quite remarkably, own
trustworthiness explains about 60% of the initial heterogeneity in beliefs. As the second
column shows, this tendency does not vanish when the game is repeated and people are thus
given the opportunity to learn about the pool of participants. The correlation weakens, and
the e⁄ect is somewhat smaller, in later rounds but both remain sizable and signi￿cant. Thus,
initial trustworthiness still a⁄ects trust beliefs even after the game has been played several
times, always drawing from an invariant pool of individuals, which we take as evidence that
false consensus persists. However, the decline in the strength of the link also suggests that
given enough opportunities to learn about a stable pool of people, the tendency to attribute
to others one￿ s own trustworthiness may vanish.37
This evidence is consistent with the idea that priors are driven, through false consensus,
by norms of behavior that shape individual￿ s own trustworthiness. To make this link even
more clear and show the ultimate relationship between cultural values and beliefs we use
information on the moral values emphasized by participants￿parents. For our purposes,
we use parents￿emphasis on two values: the ￿rst is how much emphasis an individual￿ s
35Unless the elicitation procedure is biased by risk preferences as well. We cannot rule this out completely,
as how to do so is a still-unsettled debate within experimental economics. We use a very standard quad-
ratic scoring rule. There is experimental evidence suggesting that this mechanism elicits beliefs reasonably
accurately regardless of risk preferences (see, e.g., Huck and Weisz￿cker, 2002).
36Since every dollar sent is tripled, 0.33 would imply senders believe that receivers will return as much as
is sent.
37An interesting question is whether the false consensus e⁄ect reappears any time an individual faces a
new pool of people or the pool she is interacting with changes.
27parents placed on teaching to always behave as good citizens; the second is the emphasis
parents placed on loyalty to groups or organizations. We average the responses to these two
questions and divide the result by 10 to put it on a scale￿ 0 to 1￿ comparable with beliefs.
We use this measure as a proxy for individuals￿intrinsic trustworthiness, an individual-
speci￿c trait.
Table 9, Panel B shows that this measure of parents￿e⁄ort spent on teaching good values
is correlated with individuals￿initial trustworthiness, which is consistent with behavioral
types re￿ ecting heterogeneous cultural values. Of course, it is imperfectly correlated, partly
because the measure of values that we have is only a proxy for the true trait, and partly
because own traits are also shaped by interactions in the social sphere. Panel C shows direct
regressions of trust beliefs on our survey measure of cultural values: at all repetitions the
cultural measure of trustworthiness predicts trust beliefs.
In sum, the evidence in this section shows three things. First, when no information
is available about a group, individuals form beliefs about the trustworthiness of others
extrapolating from their own types, which are quite heterogeneous. Second, this tend-
ency is highly persistent, though attenuated through learning. Third, heterogeneity in own
trustworthiness can be traced back to heterogeneous cultural norms instilled by parents.
Measures of the latter can provide valuable instruments for trust beliefs, an implication
that justi￿es our choice of instruments in Section 7.
Beliefs and performance To study the relationship between trust beliefs and economic
performance we rely on a modi￿ed version of the trust game. In particular, to match our
model (Section 3), each dollar sent in this modi￿ed trust game is increased according to
a concave ￿production￿function before reaching the receiver.38 Concavity guarantees an
internal optimal send amount given a su¢ ciently large proportion of trustworthy receivers.
We found this last condition was only satis￿ed in the ￿rst round of a pilot study using
multiple rounds of this concave trust game. Therefore, the experiment reported in this
section uses a single-round design.
There were two additional modi￿cations. First, we conducted the experiment on-line
to minimize experimenter/demand e⁄ect.39 Second, we used a full strategy method: par-
38If the sender sends S euros, the receiver receives 8S
0:5 euros.
39Conducting a single-round experiment on-line is much easier than conducting a multiple-round experi-
ment on-line as it requires much less real-time feedback. This is one reason we chose not to implement the
28ticipants submitted their actions for each role before knowing which role they would be
assigned. This allows us to construct a sender performance measure for all participants
since we know what each participant would do as a sender. For more details on the experi-
mental design, see Appendix 3.
The on-line trust game was played by 122 students at LUISS over 4 separate days.40
Each day constitutes a session. For each participant, i, we construct a measure of perform-
ance by randomly choosing another participant, j, from the same experimental session and
computing i￿ s earnings using i￿ s sender strategy and j￿ s receiver strategy.41
We use willingness-to-return amounts￿ excluding each participant￿ s own actions￿ and
beliefs about these return amounts within each session to construct a unidimensional meas-
ure of belief errors for each participant. Speci￿cally, for each participant we ￿rst compute
a separate belief error in percentage terms for each amount a receiver could have received.
This yields ten separate belief error measures for each participant, each ranging from ￿1
to 1, where negative values indicate under-estimating. We use the average of these ten
measures for each participant as our (unidimensional) belief errors measure, which again
ranges from ￿1 to 1.
Figure 8 presents a scatter plot of the relationship between this belief errors measure
and our performance measure in the on-line experiment. Consistent with our model and
with the survey data, earnings are hump-shaped in belief errors. Both those who hold overly
pessimistic trust beliefs (negative belief errors) and those who hold overly-optimistic trust
beliefs (positive belief errors) earn less than those whose belief errors are approximately zero.
This humped shape is con￿rmed by the regression presented in Table 10: the coe¢ cient on
the squared belief errors is both negative and signi￿cant.42 Furthermore, the coe¢ cient on
the linear term, regardless of signi￿cance, implies that performance attains its maximum for
belief errors close to zero. The estimated relationships suggest that senders earn between
11.00 and 11.45 euros on average when belief errors are zero, constituting a 5 to 9 percent
multiple-round experiment of the previous section on-line.
40There was no overlap in participants with the laboratory experiment.
41That is, performance for participant i is measured as the earnings they would have made if they had
been assigned the role of sender: Yi = 10:5￿Si+￿j 8S
0:5
i ￿0:5I(Si), where ￿j denotes the proportion of the
amount received, 8S
0:5
i , what the receiver j paired with i returns and I(Si) is an indicator function equal to
1 if i sends a positive amount.
42This continues to be true when we add dummies for each session to control for session ￿xed e⁄ects
and when standard errors are clustered by session, where each separate day the experiment was conducted
constitutes a aession.
29increase over the safe return (10.50 euros) from sending nothing.
To get another measure of the magnitude of income di⁄erences implied by belief er-
rors we divided the data into three categories: ￿under-estimators,￿￿over-estimators,￿and
￿accurate-estimators.￿ Accurate-estimators had belief errors within a small interval around
zero, [￿0:1;0:1]; under-estimators had belief errors below this interval; over-estimators had
belief errors above this interval. Table 11 shows that accurate-estimators earned about 18
percent more on average than under-estimators, who, in turn, earned about the same as
over-estimators.43
Summing up, the on-line experiment allows us to investigate the relationship our model
predicts between economic performance and errors in trust beliefs. The results are consistent
with both our model and the ESS evidence. Moreover, in terms of percent of income
foregone, earnings di⁄erences in the on-line experiment are of the same order of magnitude
as in the survey data.
9 Conclusions
We document the existence of a hump-shaped relationship between individual trust and
individual income. For an individual the cost of miscalibrated trust beliefs can be substantial
and of the same order of magnitude as returns to education. Though both excessive trust
and excessive mistrust are individually costly, the data suggest that the cost of trusting too
little far exceeds that of trusting too much, even in low trust countries. From a societal
point of view, however, there is an important di⁄erence between the two excesses. While
excessive mistrust and excessive trust are both individually costly, mistrust is also socially
costly as it reduces surplus creation. On the contrary, excessive trust may create social
surplus even if this surplus is allocated in a way that harms the overly trusting individual.
This di⁄erence reconciles our ￿ndings of a concave relationship between performance and
trust at the individual level and the monotonically increasing relationship found in aggregate
data.
43As rough robustness checks (not reported, but available on request) we also ran the regressions in Table 11
using a wider interval￿ [￿0:15;0:15]￿ or a narrower interval￿ [￿0:05;0:05]￿ to de￿ne accurate-estimators,
as well as using a de￿nition of over- and under-estimators de￿ned by the 33rd and 66th percentiles of the
observed belief errors. None of these modi￿cations changed the results qualitatively: accurate-estimators
consistently earned more, on average, than others.
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34Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
A. European Social Survey 
  Whole sample  Immigrants sample
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Log income 9.695 1.072 9.659 1.233
Trust  5.033 2.498 4.988 2.479
Risk tolerance 2.982 1.429 2.991 1.454
Age  46.691 17.771 46.044 17.255
Male  0.473 0.499 0.457 0.498
Immigrant 0.075 0.263   
Married 0.558 0.497 0.542 0.498
Single  0.263 0.440 0.256 0.436
Father primary 0.406 0.491 .370 0.483
Father secondary 0.487 0.500 0.474 0.499
Primary 0.192 0.394 0.163 0.369
Secondary 0.605 0.489 0.608 0.488
Big city  0.323 0.468 0.378 0.485
Small city 0.308 0.462 0.303 0.459
Unemployed 0.051 0.220 0.055 0.229
Out of labor force 0.535 0.499 0.531 0.499
Altruism  5.052 0.886   
Religiosity 4.97 2.98    
Cheated: Bank 1.494 0.892 1.466 0.869
Cheated: Second hand goods 1.374 0.792 1.357 0.772
Cheated: Food 2.106 1.435 2.085 1.384
Cheated: Plumber, repairer 1.629 1.000 1.685 1.043
Cheated (sum) 2.473 2.753 2.552 2.721
Cheated (principal component) 0.099 1.379 0.133 1.366
Trustworthiness 16.177 9.454   
Professionals 0.137 0.344   
Technicians 0.164 0.370   
35 
 Clerks  0.109 0.312   
Workers 0.142 0.349   
Agricultural workers 0.041 0.197   
Mechanics, repairers, textile workers 0.137 0.344   
Assemblers, operators and drivers 0.079 0.270   
Labourers and elementary occupations 0.103 0.303   
Fraction of first generation immigrants    0.535 0.499
First generation immigrants: old arrivals    0.534 0.499
Trust in the country of origin    0.271 0.132
 
B. Laboratory Experiment 
Variable mean  St  dev 
Good Values  0.637  0.199 
Initial own trustworthiness  0.32  0.162 
Expected trustworthiness (trust belief) 0.265  0.158 
Return Proportion  0.211  0.18 
Invest Amount  5.258  3.107 
Invest Propensity  0.676  0.469 
 
C. On-line Experiment 
Variable mean  St  dev 
Invest Propensity  0.730  0.446 
Invest Amount  3.934  3.315 
Estimates of Return Proportion  1.287  0.578 
Return Proportion  1.312  0.669 
Trust Belief Error  -0.007  0.145 







 Table 2 
Trust and Income 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Log inc.  Log inc.  Log inc.  Log inc. 
Trust1 0.003  0.004  0.006   
  (0.026) (0.027) (0.028)   
Trust 2  0.031  0.039*  0.035   
  (0.023) (0.024) (0.024)   
Trust  3  0.071*** 0.081*** 0.086***   
  (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)   
Trust  4  0.082*** 0.083*** 0.081***   
  (0.022) (0.023) (0.023)   
Trust  5  0.081*** 0.083*** 0.085***   
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)   
Trust  6  0.119*** 0.126*** 0.124***   
  (0.022) (0.022) (0.023)   
Trust  7  0.134*** 0.142*** 0.142***   
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.022)   
Trust  8  0.138*** 0.145*** 0.145***   
  (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)   
Trust  9  0.133*** 0.138*** 0.141***   
  (0.027) (0.028) (0.028)   
Trust 10  0.071**  0.079**  0.091**   
  (0.035) (0.036) (0.037)   
Trust       0.030*** 
       (0.006) 
Trust squared        -0.002** 
       (0.001) 
Age  0.002*  0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age  squared  -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male  0.049*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.041*** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
Primary  education  -0.483*** -0.480*** -0.478*** -0.482*** 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
Secondary education  -0.262***  -0.261*** -0.262*** -0.263*** 
  (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
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 Married  0.408*** 0.407*** 0.408*** 0.407*** 
  (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Single  0.115*** 0.118*** 0.121*** 0.118*** 
  (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Father primary education  -0.155***  -0.157***  -0.155***  -0.157*** 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) 
Father secondary education  -0.054***  -0.057***  -0.057***  -0.057*** 
  (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Unemployed  -0.508*** -0.500*** -0.506*** -0.501*** 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) 
Out of labor force  -0.179***  -0.167***  -0.166***  -0.167*** 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Immigrant  -0.158*** -0.157*** -0.158*** -0.158*** 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Big  city  0.065*** 0.072*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Small  city  0.031*** 0.039*** 0.037*** 0.040*** 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Risk  tolerance    0.015*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 
    (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Altruism       -0.019***  
     (0.005)   
Observations  30254 28383 27687 28383 
R-squared  0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 
Test trust2= trust8 (p-values) 0.00 0.00  0.00
Test trust10=trust8 (p-values) 0.05 0.04  0.03
Notes: [1] Each regression controls for country and region fixed effects; the F-test for the joint significant of these 
coefficients has always p-value of 0.000; [2] Standard errors are clustered at the country level, *** significant at 1%, ** 
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.  [3] Trust is the answer to the following question: “Generally speaking would you 
say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 
0 to 10, where 0 means you can’t be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted”; Risk tolerance and 
Altruism are the answers to the following questions: “Now I will briefly describe some people. Tell me how much each 
person is or is not like you: very much like me (6), like me (5), somewhat like me (4), a little like me (3), not like me (2), 
not like me at all (1); She/he looks for adventures and likes to take risks. She/he wants to have an exciting life.  (Risk 
aversion); It is important to her/him to be loyal to her/his friends. She/he wants to devote herself/himself to people 
close to her/him.(Altruism). [4] The excluded group for education and father education are people with college or more; 
the excluded group for marital status is divorced or widows/widowers; the excluded group for labor status are people 
employed; the excluded group for city size are people living in a country village, a farm or a home in the countryside. 
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 Table 3 
Trust and Income, Controlling for Moderation 
  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Trust  0.003  0.037 0.079***  0.081*** 0.081*** 0.124*** 0.139*** 0.143*** 0.136***  0.079** 
  (0.027) (0.024)  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.020)  (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.028)  (0.036) 
Risk tolerance  0.025**  0.047*** 0.066***  0.069***  0.054**        
  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.023)       
Test of equality  
of coef. (p-values) 






     
Trust  0.003  0.036 0.079***  0.079*** 0.080*** 0.124*** 0.139*** 0.143*** 0.135***  0.076** 
  (0.027) (0.024)  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.020)  (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.028)  (0.036) 
Altruism  0.086  0.095  0.089  0.110  0.098       
  (0.083)  (0.076)  (0.074)  (0.074)  (0.074)       
Test of equality  
of coef. (p-values) 






     
Trust  -0.011  0.022  0.060**  0.058**  0.065**  0.103*** 0.114*** 0.123*** 0.112***  0.058 
  (0.030) (0.026)  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.023)  (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.030)  (0.039) 
Political ideology  -0.030  0.035  -0.008  0.001 0.010 0.044  0.084***  0.074**  0.056  0.024 
  (0.039) (0.031)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.027)  (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.036)  (0.036) 
Test of equality  All equal coeff  Trust2=Trust8  Trust10=Trust8         
of coef. (p-values)  (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.06)        
Trust  0.002  0.033 0.075***  0.077*** 0.079*** 0.119*** 0.137*** 0.143*** 0.142***  0.084** 
  (0.027) (0.024)  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.020)  (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.028)  (0.036) 
Religiosity  0.030  0.005  0.048***  -0.007 -0.023 -0.014  -0.017  -0.053*** -0.077*** -0.095*** 
  (0.021) (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.020)  (0.016)  (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.022)  (0.022) 
Test of equality of 
coef. (p-values) 






     
Notes: [1] Each regression controls for country, region fixed effects and the full set of controls of column 3 Table 2; [2] Standard errors are clustered at the country level, 
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.  [3] Trust is the answer to the following question: “Generally speaking would you say that most people can 
be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you can’t be too careful and 10 means that most 
people can be trusted”; Risk tolerance and Altruism are the answers to the following question: “Now I will briefly describe some people. Tell me how much each person is or 
is not like you: very much like me (6), like me (5), somewhat like me (4), a little like me (3), not like me (2), not like me at all (1); She/he looks for adventures and likes to 
take risks. She/he wants to have an exciting life.  (Risk aversion); It is important to her/him to be loyal to her/his friends. She/he wants to devote herself/himself to people 
close to her/him.(Altruism); Religiosity is a question asking the respondents how religious they are; the scale goes from “Not at all religious” (0) to “Very religious” (10). 




 Table 4 
Trust and Income in Low and High Trust Countries 
  Log income  Log income  Log income  Log income 
  Trust lower than 
median  
Trust above or 
equal to median 
Low trust  High trust 
Trust 1  0.011  -0.001  0.008  0.007 
  (0.034) (0.044) (0.033) (0.047) 
Trust 2  -0.005  0.105***  0.006  0.103*** 
  (0.031) (0.037) (0.029) (0.039) 
Trust  3  0.069** 0.100*** 0.060** 0.113*** 
  (0.029) (0.033) (0.028) (0.035) 
Trust  4  0.058* 0.104*** 0.058* 0.109*** 
  (0.032) (0.034) (0.030) (0.036) 
Trust  5  0.085*** 0.086*** 0.076*** 0.095*** 
  (0.028) (0.031) (0.027) (0.033) 
Trust  6  0.140*** 0.130*** 0.143*** 0.130*** 
  (0.034) (0.032) (0.032) (0.034) 
Trust  7  0.144*** 0.154*** 0.150*** 0.156*** 
  (0.034) (0.031) (0.032) (0.033) 
Trust  8  0.116*** 0.162*** 0.120*** 0.165*** 
  (0.040) (0.032) (0.038) (0.034) 
Trust  9  0.053 0.163*** 0.049 0.167*** 
  (0.063) (0.037) (0.060) (0.038) 
Trust  10  0.066 0.093** 0.063 0.097** 
  (0.078) (0.044) (0.074) (0.046) 
Observations  9971  18412 10916 17467 
R-squared  0.42 0.51 0.46 0.51 
Test of equality of coeff. tru7=tru9 (0.14)  tru9=tru10 (0.07)  tru7=tru9 (0.09)  tru9=tru10 (0.08) 
(p-values)  tru7=tru2 (0.00)  tru9=tru2 (0.07) tru7=tru2  (0.00) tru9=tru2  (0.05) 
Notes: [1] The specification follows the main specification of Table 2; [2] Standard errors are clustered at the country level, *** 
significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. [3] Trust is the answer to the following question: “Generally speaking 
would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score 
of 0 to 10, where 0 means you can’t be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted”; [4] Column 1 restrict the 
sample to countries with trust lower than the median in the sample (equal to 5); column 2 restricts the sample to countries with 
trust equal or higher than the median; [5] In columns 3, we define low trust countries those with fat tail to the left including 
Greece,  Italy, Portugal, Turkey, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovania and Slovakia; in column 4, we define high trust 






Trust and Cheating: First Stage Regressions 
 


















Trustworthiness .0084***  .0078***  .0082*** .0087*** .0089*** .0089*** 
  (.0020) (.0019)  (.0019) (.0019) (.0021) (.0021) 
Observations  21163 22663  23062 22463 19774 19774 
R-squared  0.23 0.23  0.23 0.23 0.24 0.23 
Notes: [1] Standard errors are clustered at the country level, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant 
at 10%. [2] Trust is the answer to the following question: “Generally speaking would you say that most people can 
be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 
means you can’t be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted”; Trustworthiness is the sum of the 
following three questions: “I am going to read out a list of things about your working life. Using this card, please say 
how much the management at your work allows/allowed you to 1) decide how your own daily work is/was 
organized; 2) influence policy decisions about the activities of the organization? 3) to choose or change your pace of 
work?” The answer to each question can take values from I have/had no influence (0) to I have had complete 
control (10). [3] The cheating variables are the answer to the following questions: “how often, if ever, have each of 
these things happened to you in the last five years? A bank or insurance company failed to offer you the best deal 
you were entitled to; you were sold something second-hand that quickly proved to be faulty; you were sold food 
that was packed to conceal the worse bits; A plumber, builder, car mechanic or other repair person overcharged you 












\ Table 6 
Trust and Cheating, Instrumental Variable Regressions 


















Trust 0.817***  0.234**  0.599*** 0.534*** 2.271***  1.164*** 
 (0.219)  (0.100)  (0.197)  (0.158)  (0.610)  (0.312) 
Age 0.010*  -0.008***  0.013***  0.008*  0.016  0.007 
 (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.017)  (0.009) 
Age squared  -0.000***  -0.000  -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001***  -0.000*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Male 0.099***  0.088***  -0.173*** 0.112***  0.128  0.106** 
 (0.033)  (0.015)  (0.029)  (0.024)  (0.096)  (0.049) 
Immigrant 0.009  0.043*  -0.004  0.033  0.046  0.028 
 (0.057)  (0.026)  (0.051)  (0.044)  (0.171)  (0.087) 
Married -0.160***  -0.059**  -0.108**  -0.174*** -0.538***  -0.279*** 
 (0.059)  (0.026)  (0.054)  (0.045)  (0.178)  (0.091) 
Single -0.279***  -0.047  -0.235*** -0.254*** -0.795***  -0.403*** 
 (0.069)  (0.031)  (0.064)  (0.052)  (0.199)  (0.102) 
Primary 0.214**  0.103**  0.114  0.117  0.662**  0.345** 
 (0.109)  (0.048)  (0.099)  (0.079)  (0.319)  (0.163) 
Secondary 0.202**  0.099***  0.090  0.090  0.573**  0.304** 
 (0.081)  (0.037)  (0.072)  (0.058)  (0.238)  (0.122) 
Father  primary 0.236**  0.023 0.110  0.054  0.379 0.199 
 (0.100)  (0.045)  (0.090)  (0.072)  (0.267)  (0.136) 
Father secondary  0.155**  0.017  0.030  0.045  0.267  0.140 
 (0.076)  (0.035)  (0.066)  (0.057)  (0.210)  (0.107) 
Unemployed 0.250***  0.112***  0.249*** 0.161** 0.692***  0.350*** 
 (0.092)  (0.043)  (0.085)  (0.067)  (0.258)  (0.132) 
Out of labor force  0.056  0.035**  0.167***  0.071**  0.283***  0.131** 
 (0.036)  (0.017)  (0.035)  (0.029)  (0.105)  (0.053) 
Risk tolerance  -0.009  0.006  -0.031**  -0.001  -0.043  -0.018 
 (0.015)  (0.007)  (0.014)  (0.011)  (0.044)  (0.023) 
Log income  -0.049  -0.036**  -0.030  -0.017  -0.133  -0.071 
 (0.033)  (0.015)  (0.031)  (0.025)  (0.092)  (0.047) 
Big city  0.095**  0.024  0.195***  0.113***  0.481***  0.230*** 
 (0.044)  (0.020)  (0.039)  (0.033)  (0.125)  (0.064) 
Small city  0.123***  0.058***  0.166*** 0.114*** 0.489***  0.244*** 
 (0.046)  (0.020)  (0.039)  (0.032)  (0.130)  (0.067) 
Observations 21163  22633  23062  22463  19774  19774 
Notes: [1] Each regression controls for country, region fixed effects and 8 occupational dummies [2] Standard 
errors are clustered at the country level, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.  [3] Trust is 
the answer to the following question: “Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted or that 
you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you can’t be 
too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted”; [4] Trust is instrumented using the variable 
Trustworthiness obtained as the sum of the answers to the following three questions: “I am going to read out a list of 
things about your working life. Using this card, please say how much the management at your work allows/allowed 
you to 1) decide how your own daily work is/was organized; 2) influence policy decisions about the activities of 
the organization? 3) to choose or change your pace of work?” The answer to each question can take values from 0 
(I have/had no influence) to 10 (I have/ had complete control). [5] The excluded group for education and father 
education are people with college or more; the excluded group for marital status is “divorced or widow/er”; the 
excluded group for labor status are people employed; the excluded group for city size are people living in a country 
village, a farm or a home in the countryside. 
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 Table 7 
Trust and Cheating, Evidence from First and Second Generation Immigrants 


















Trust-first gen.  0.271**  0.080  0.666*** 0.348* 1.491*** 0.698*** 
 (0.103)  (0.154)  (0.220)  (0.195)  (0.489)  (0.240) 
Trust-second gen.  -0.031  0.127  -0.224  -0.066  -0.493  -0.218 
 (0.194)  (0.211)  (0.171)  (0.265)  (0.614)  (0.326) 
Risk tolerance  0.031***  0.030** 0.004  -0.006  0.063  0.036 
 (0.011)  (0.014)  (0.018)  (0.016)  (0.054)  (0.027) 
Age 0.024***  0.003  0.036***  0.016*** 0.072***  0.036*** 
 (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.009)  (0.005)  (0.018)  (0.009) 
Age squared  -0.000***  -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001***  -0.000*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Male 0.149***  0.027  -0.170**  0.101***  0.092  0.089 
 (0.026)  (0.030)  (0.066)  (0.037)  (0.144)  (0.071) 
Married 0.010  -0.052  -0.043  -0.048  -0.068  -0.035 
 (0.036)  (0.037)  (0.060)  (0.049)  (0.156)  (0.079) 
Single -0.048  -0.004  -0.054  -0.217***  -0.291**  -0.144* 
 (0.049)  (0.051)  (0.064)  (0.061)  (0.142)  (0.075) 
Primary -0.266***  0.024  -0.292***  -0.346*** -0.983***  -0.490*** 
 (0.046)  (0.048)  (0.087)  (0.071)  (0.180)  (0.089) 
Secondary -0.190***  -0.017  -0.254*** -0.281*** -0.770***  -0.378*** 
 (0.040)  (0.039)  (0.073)  (0.056)  (0.165)  (0.081) 
Unemployed 0.005  0.046  -0.031  -0.032  -0.121  -0.058 
 (0.065)  (0.063)  (0.101)  (0.060)  (0.236)  (0.113) 
Out of labor force  -0.032  -0.014  0.092  0.009  0.060  0.020 
 (0.032)  (0.025)  (0.059)  (0.035)  (0.117)  (0.056) 
Big city  -0.018  -0.008  0.042  0.060  0.150  0.068 
 (0.028)  (0.038)  (0.051)  (0.058)  (0.120)  (0.061) 
Small city  -0.049  -0.002  0.018  0.057  -0.007  -0.007 
 (0.034)  (0.019)  (0.045)  (0.044)  (0.124)  (0.061) 
First generation  -0.106  0.060  -0.269*** -0.112 -0.596*** -0.270** 
 (0.071)  (0.078)  (0.084)  (0.074)  (0.191)  (0.103) 
Observations 3724  4165  4364  4086  3404  3404 
R-squared 0.15  0.13  0.15  0.11  0.17  0.17 
Notes: [1] Each regression controls for country and region fixed effects. [2] Standard errors are clustered at the 
country of origin level, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. [3] Trust is the average, 
calculated at the country level from the World Value Survey, of the following question: “Generally speaking 
would you say that most people can be trusted (1) or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people (0)? [4] 
The cheating variables are the answer to the following questions: “how often, if ever, has each of these things 
happened to you in the last five years? A bank or insurance company failed to offer you the best deal you were 
entitled to; you were sold something second-hand that quickly proved to be faulty; you were sold food that was 
packed to conceal the worse bits; A plumber, builder, car mechanic or other repair person overcharged you or 
did unnecessary work” The answer could take values Never (1), once (2), twice (3), 3 or 4 time (4), 5 times or 
more (5). [5] First generation immigrants are defined as individuals born in countries different than the country 
of residence; Second generation immigrants are individual born in their country of residence and whose fathers 
were born abroad. [5] The excluded group for education are people with college or more; the excluded group for 
marital status are divorced or widows; the excluded group for labor status are people employed; the excluded 





 Table 8 
Trust and Cheating, First Generation Immigrants, by Year of Arrival 


















Trust: new arrivals  0.663*  0.292  0.473  0.770**  2.022*  1.056* 
 (0.381)  (0.279)  (0.444)  (0.332)  (1.056)  (0.534) 
Trust: old arrivals  0.206  0.114  0.425  0.123  1.190  0.578 
 (0.189)  (0.196)  (0.294)  (0.312)  (0.810)  (0.411) 
Risk tolerance  0.055***  0.030*  0.013  0.002  0.101*  0.056* 
 (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.058)  (0.030) 
Age 0.021**  -0.005  0.038***  0.008  0.057**  0.028** 
 (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.012)  (0.009)  (0.023)  (0.012) 
Age squared  -0.000***  -0.000  -0.000*** -0.000* -0.001*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Male 0.112**  -0.034  -0.170**  0.075  -0.055  0.005 
 (0.043)  (0.054)  (0.074)  (0.046)  (0.175)  (0.090) 
Married  -0.011  -0.011  -0.012 -0.082 -0.019  -0.010 
 (0.050)  (0.034)  (0.086)  (0.068)  (0.218)  (0.102) 
Single -0.024  0.066  -0.023  -0.287***  -0.030  0.003 
 (0.071)  (0.071)  (0.111)  (0.102)  (0.246)  (0.127) 
Primary -0.101  -0.001  -0.198*  -0.279***  -0.607*  -0.304* 
 (0.106)  (0.064)  (0.098)  (0.097)  (0.307)  (0.158) 
Secondary -0.089  -0.062  -0.107  -0.203**  -0.401  -0.212 
 (0.084)  (0.048)  (0.067)  (0.083)  (0.254)  (0.131) 
Unemployed 0.044  -0.062  -0.114  -0.110  -0.758*  -0.382* 
 (0.089)  (0.088)  (0.148)  (0.109)  (0.390)  (0.195) 
Out of labor force  -0.044  -0.027  0.084  -0.040  -0.039  -0.029 
 (0.058)  (0.045)  (0.077)  (0.050)  (0.188)  (0.096) 
Big city  0.027  -0.020  0.008  -0.015  0.132  0.062 
 (0.055)  (0.038)  (0.095)  (0.094)  (0.160)  (0.082) 
Small city  -0.023  0.006  -0.020  0.004  0.017  0.011 
 (0.059)  (0.040)  (0.045)  (0.059)  (0.142)  (0.078) 
Old  arrivals  0.121  0.121  0.061 0.218* 0.378  0.201 
 (0.144)  (0.100)  (0.138)  (0.115)  (0.358)  (0.186) 
Observations  1816  2035  2122 2004 1655  1655 
R-squared  0.18  0.19  0.18 0.16 0.22  0.22 
Notes: [1] Each regression controls for country and region fixed effects. [2] Standard errors are clustered at the country or 
origin level, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.  [3] Trust is the average, calculated at the country 
level from the World Value Survey, of the following question: “Generally speaking would you say that most people can be 
trusted (1) or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people (0)? [4] The cheating variables are the answer to the 
following questions: “how often, if ever, has each of these things happened to you in the last five years? A bank or insurance 
company failed to offer you the best deal you were entitled to; you were sold something second-hand that quickly proved to 
be faulty; you were sold food that was packed to conceal the worse bits; A plumber, builder, car mechanic or other repair 
person overcharged you or did unnecessary work” The answer could take values Never (1), once (2), twice (3), 3 or 4 time 
(4) 5 times or more (5). [5] Old arrivals are first generation immigrants arrived in the country more than 20 years ago; new 
arrivals are first generation immigrants arrived in the country up to 20 years ago. [6] The excluded group for education are 
people with college or more; the excluded group for marital status are divorced or widows; the excluded group for labor 
status are people employed; the excluded group for city size are people living in a country village, a farm or a home in the 
countryside. 
      
44 
 Table 9 
The effect of own trustworthiness on trust beliefs  
A. OLS estimates of expected trustworthiness on own initial trustworthiness 










        
Own initial trustworthiness  0.744***  0.542***  0.475***  0.452*** 
  (0.0419) (0.0652) (0.0748) (0.0766) 
Constant  0.0848*** 0.106*** 0.0763*** 0.0653** 
  (0.0161) (0.0232) (0.0264) (0.0246) 
Observations  276 208 171 171 
R-squared  0.586 0.312 0.261 0.249 
 























C. OLS estimates of expected trustworthiness on good values 










Good Values  0.122**  0.125*  0.122*  0.0515 
  (0.0588) (0.0662) (0.0725) (0.0824) 
Constant  0.246*** 0.197*** 0.143*** 0.171*** 
  (0.0376) (0.0434) (0.0448) (0.0531) 
Observations  339 262 216 216 
R-squared  0.025 0.027 0.027 0.004 
Notes: [1] Robust standard errors, clustered by participant, are reported in parentheses, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.  
[2] Clustering by subject is appropriate because there are multiple observations for each subject due to the multiple-round 
experimental design. [3] Clustering by session does not change any of the significance levels in panels A and B.  In panel C, 
clustering by session reduces the significance of the coefficient on good values in column 1 to the 10% level (p=0.061), and 
increases the p-values of the “good values” in columns 2 and 3 to p=0.198 and 0.125, respectively. [4] The numbers of 
observations falls in later rounds because some sessions, due to time constraints, contained fewer than 12 rounds.  [5] The 
number of observations falls when including our “good values” measure, because some participants did not complete the survey.  
[6] Initial  own trustworthiness is the average proportion of money received that a subject would return---averaged over each possible 
amount that could be received---measured the first time the subject was assigned the role of receiver.  To minimize 
contamination of this measure of trustworthiness by learning, while still maintaining a reasonable number of observations, all 
regressions using this measure only include subjects who were an entrepreneur for the first time in one of the first two rounds. [7] 
Good Values is the average of two measures obtained from a survey that subjects completed either a week prior or a week after 
their experimental session occurred: i) the emphasis, on a scale from 0 to 10, that the subject’s parents placed on being a model 
citizen as a value during their upbringing; and, ii) on the same scale, the emphasis their parents placed on group loyalty. We then 
divide the resulting average by 10 to put this measure on a scale comparable to beliefs (0 to 1).  [8] Expected Trustworthiness is the 
average proportion each subject expected entrepreneurs to return within a particular round. Beliefs were elicited in an incentive-
compatible manner for each possible investment level; the variable used is the average of these beliefs, for each subject, over each 
possible amount a receiver could receive. Beliefs were elicited regardless of the role the subject played in a particular round; if the 
subject was currently a receiver, they were instructed to exclude their own action from the calculation, and remunerated on this 















Trust belief errors and economic performance in the on-line experiment 
OLS estimates of sender’s earnings on errors in trust beliefs 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
      
Belief Errors   1.898  2.196  2.196** 
 (1.595)  (1.577)  (0.742) 
Belief Errors Squared  -24.061*** -23.360***  -23.360** 
 (7.353)  (7.945)  (4.798) 
Constant 11.465***  10.995*** 10.995*** 
 (0.356)  (0.639)  (0.118) 
      
Session Fixed Effects?  No  Yes  Yes 
      
Session-Clustered Std Errors?  No  No  Yes 
      
Observations 122  122  122 
R-squared 0.05  0.07  0.07 
Notes: [1] Robust standard errors are in parentheses, *** significant at 1%,  ** 
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.  [2] Belief errors are defined by the difference 
between a participant’s estimate of the proportion of money  received that a receiver 
will return and the actual average return proportion within each session, averaged over 
each possible amount a receiver could receive.  This value excludes the participant’s 
















Earnings by trust belief categories in the on-line experiment 
OLS estimates of sender’s earnings on dummies for trust beliefs categories 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
      
Accurate Estimators  1.860***  1.773***  1.773** 
 (0.663)  (0.657)  (0.500) 
Over-estimator 0.311  0.324  0.324 
 (0.706)  (0.681)  (0.352) 
Constant 9.930***  9.554*** 9.554*** 
 (0.525)  (0.603)  (0.135) 
      
Session Fixed Effects?  No  Yes  Yes 
      
Session-Clustered Std Errors?  No  No  Yes 
      
Observations 122  122  122 
R-squared 0.07  0.09  0.09 
Notes: [1] Robust standard errors are in parentheses, *** significant at 1%,  ** 
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.  [2] Dependent variable is sender’s earnings in 
euros.  [3] The excluded category is “under-estimators.” [4] Belief  error categories are 
defined as follows:  “Accurate Estimators” had an average belief error within the 
interval [-0.1, 0.1]; “Over-estimators” had an average belief error in the interval (0.1,1]; 
“Under-estimators” had an average belief error in the interval [-1,-0.1).  [5] We also 
considered wider and narrower  intervals separating the three categories, using [-0.15, 
0.15] and [-.05, 0.05] to define accurate estimators.  This did not change anything 
qualitatively;  [6] Another specification used the 33rd and 66th percentiles of the error 
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Most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful
Graphs by Country
Trust beliefs: density functions by country 
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 Figure 7 
Heterogeneity in trust beliefs and own trustworthiness  
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Trust belief errors and performance in the on-line experiment   
 Appendix 1: Proof of proposition 1.





p is such that (1￿p)￿f0(S￿
p) ￿ 1 from the ￿rst order condition

















@(1￿p): It follows that
@Y (S￿
p)
@(1￿p) = 0 when (1 ￿ p) = (1 ￿ ￿) and
@Y (S￿
p)
@(1￿p) ? 0 when (1 ￿ p) ?
(1￿￿); implying Y (S￿
p) is concave in (1￿p) and achieves a maximum when (1￿p) = (1￿￿):
Appendix 2: The European Social Survey
The central aim of the ESS is to gather data about changing values, attitudes, attributes
and behavior patterns within European polities. Academically driven but designed to feed
into key European policy debates, the ESS hopes to measure and explain how people￿ s social
values, cultural norms and behavior patterns are distributed; the ways in which they di⁄er
within and between nations; and the direction and speed at which they are changing.
Data collection takes place every two years, by means of face-to-face interviews lasting
around one hour, which are followed by a short supplement. The questionnaire consists of
a ￿ core￿module lasting about half an hour￿ which remains relatively constant from round
to round￿ plus two ￿ rotating￿modules, repeated at intervals. Each of these latter modules
is devoted to a substantive topic or theme.
The purpose of the rotating modules is to provide an in-depth focus on a series of
particular academic or policy concerns, while the core module aims instead to monitor
change or continuity in a wide range of socio-economic, socio-political, socio-psychological
and socio-demographic variables.
We use the second round of the ESS containing the following 26 countries: Austria, Bel-
gium. Switzerland, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France,
Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, Turkey, Ukraine.
Each respondent in the European Social Survey is asked to report which income category,
identi￿ed with a letter, best approximates his or her household￿ s total net income. The
values, in euros, are de￿ned according to the following table:
Household income
Approximate weekly Approximate monthly Approximate annual
J Less than 40 Less than 150 Less than 1800
R 40 to under 70 150 to under 300 1800 to under 3600
C 70 to under 120 300 to under 500 3600 to under 6000
M 120 to under 230 500 to under 1000 6000 to under 12000
F 230 to under 350 1000 to under 1500 12000 to under 18000
S 350 to under 460 1500 to under 2000 18000 to under 24000
K 460 to under 580 2000 to under 2500 24000 to under 30000
P 580 to under 690 2500 to under 3000 30000 to under 36000
D 690 to under 1150 3000 to under 5000 36000 to under 60000
H 1150 to under 1730 5000 to under 7500 60000 to under 90000
U 1730 to under 2310 7500 to under 10000 90000 to under 120000
N 2310 or more 10000 or more 120000 or more
1Appendix 3: Trust Experiment Design
Laboratory Experiment
Participants were recruited from a pre-existing list of students who had previously
expressed willingness to take part in experiments, in general, at LUISS Guido Carli
University in Rome, Italy. All laboratory sessions were conducted at CESARE, the
lab facility at LUISS. The experiment was programmed and implemented using the
software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
After showing up to the lab at pre-scheduled session times, instructions were seated
at individual desks in the lab, each separated by opaque dividers, and each equipped
with its own computer. Instructions were then read aloud by the experimenters,
and participants￿questions, if any, were answered by the experimenters. This initial
phase￿ instructions and seating￿ typically took from 15-30 minutes.
After questions were answered, subjects proceeded to the game-playing phase.
This phase consisted of up to twelve rounds of the trust game, as described below.
Participants were not informed how many rounds of game-play there would be, but
rather only instructed that there would be ￿several￿ rounds. This was meant to
mimimize end-game e⁄ects possible when the number of rounds is known. Because
sessions were scheduled to last (up to) two hours, and because most participants had
never participated in any experiment before (CESARE is a new facility) the number
of rounds per session varied widely. Sessions consisted of anywhere from 3 to 12
rounds, with the majority consisting of 12 rounds.
Even though the experiment involved repeating the same game for multiple rounds,
participants were randomly re-matched with an anonymous partner each round, and
within each pairing roles were randomly reassigned. These design features allow for
learning about the population￿ s preferences but not about any speci￿c person￿ s pref-
erences, as desired. It also ameliorates many repeated-game e⁄ects that are possible
when partners are uniquely identi￿able, or persist over rounds￿ such as reputation
builiding or punishing/rewarding speci￿c partners for past behavior￿ that, while im-
portant in the real world, are not the focus of this experiment.
The trust game is a two-player sequential-moves game of perfect information. The
￿rst-mover, called the ￿sender,￿is endowed with 10:50 euros. The second-mover￿ the
￿receiver￿ ￿ has no endowment. The sender chooses to send some, all or none of his
or her endowment to the receiver. Any amount sent is tripled by the experimenter
before being given to the receiver. The receiver then chooses to return some, all or
none of this tripled amount back to the sender, ending the game. Sending a positive
amount entailed a small fee￿ 0:50 euros.
Senders were allowed to send either 0 (euros), and retain 10:50, or send any positive
whole-euro amount: 1;2;:::;10. Receivers￿decisions were collected using the strategy
method. Before receivers discovered how much their sender sent, they speci￿ed how
much they would return for any amount of money they could receive. Speci￿cally,
receivers were faced with a series of ten separate screens, each asking only one ques-
tion: ￿if you receive m euros, how much will you return?￿For each separate screeen,
m was replaced with exactly one value, m 2 f3;:::;30g = f3 ￿ 1;:::;3 ￿ 10g. The
order of possible amounts, m, was randomized in order to avoid inducing any arti￿cial
2consistency in receivers￿strategies and to make each decision feel as real as possible
to receivers. This random order was the same for all receivers within each round,
and was re-randomized between rounds. Obviously, no information about receivers￿
decisions was shared with senders in any way before the end of each round.
At the end of each round, each sender and receiver pair was informed of the
outcome of their interaction only￿ i.e., how much the sender sent, and, if this was
a positive amount, how much the receiver returned as determined by the relevant
element of the receiver￿ s strategy vector. No other elements of the receiver￿ s strategy
vector was revealed.
To collect beliefs, within each round every participant, regardless of the role they
had been assigned, was asked to estimate the amounts receivers would return, on
average, for each possible amount receivers could receive. Speci￿cally, participants
answered ten questions: ￿How much would receivers return, on average, if they were
to receive m euros?￿ , m 2 f3;:::;30g. Participants who were currently receivers were
told to exclude their own actions from this estimate, and estimate how much other
receivers would return, to rule out any mechanical￿ real or imagined￿ connection
between own-actions and estimates.
Incentives to report beliefs truthfully were given by paying subjects according to
a quadratic scoring rule. It is well-known that this rule gives (risk-neutral) indi-
viduals incentives compatible with reporting truthfully the mean of their subjective
distribution of beliefs. Speci￿cally, for each of the ten belief questions participants
earned an amount of money given by the function below, where c rm is receivers es-
timated return amount, rm is receivers actual (average) return amount, and as above
m 2 f3;:::;30g:
Earnings = 1 ￿ (




For example, if a subject￿ s estimate of receivers￿average return amount, condi-
tional on receiving 9 euros, was 6 euros￿ i.e., b r9 = 6￿ and receivers￿strategy vectors
entailed returning (on average) 2 euros conditional on receiving 9, then that parti-









A perfect estimate paid 1 euro, so that subjects could earn up to 10 euros each
round from their estimates. Beliefs were elicited either before or after participants
submitted their actions, with this order being randomly re-determined for each par-
ticipant before each round.
When all rounds were completed, one round was selected at random and parti-
cipants were paid in accordance with their actions and the accuracy of their estimates
in that round. This procedure is meant to eliminate wealth e⁄ects from accumulated
earnings over rounds and is standard in the literature. All of these design elements
3were (commonly) known by all participants.
On-line Experiment
Participants were recruited from the same pre-existing list of potential experi-
mental student participants at LUISS in Rome, Italy. We excluded from the list of
invitees anybody who had taken part in the laboratory experiment, so that no in-
dividual took part in both the in-lab and the on-line experiment. This experiment
was conducted on four separate days, each day constituting a session. In total, 122
students participated in the on-line experiment.
The on-line experiment implemented one round of the trust game in the same
manner as above with three exceptions. The ￿rst exception is that the function used to
transform money sent into money received was no longer linear, but rather quadratic.
This function was presented to participants in table form (below). Secondly, a full
strategy method was used: participants submitted their decisions in both possible
roles before learning which role they would be assigned. Finally, participants did not
know their beliefs would be elicited until after they submitted their decisions. This
weakens concerns that belief elicitation itself could a⁄ect decisions.
If the sender sends (euros):
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Then the receiver will receive (euros):
8.05 11.30 13.85 16.05 17.90 19.60 21.20 22.65 24.05 25.30
In terms of earnings, two features are notable. First, belief accuracy was remu-
nerated using a slightly di⁄erent procedure: a randomized quadratic scoring scoring
rule. Schlag and van der Weele (2009), among others, have proven that this proced-
ure is theoretically robust to indvidual risk preferences. Speci￿cally, each estimate
is converted into a number, z 2 [0;1], precisely as above. At the same time, the
computer chooses at random a number, y 2 [0;1]. If y ￿ z, the participant earns 5
euros, otherwise the estimate pays nothing. At the end of the session, one estimate
is randomly chosen to count towards a participants potential earnings. The second
feature of note is that only 10 percent of participant pairs were (randomly) chosen
to be paid according to their decisions and estimates. Since the on-line experiment
required much less of participants￿time, this kept hourly earnings comparable to
earnings in the laboratory experiment.
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Trust and Income, by Education and Age 
  Log inc  Log income  Log inc  Log inc 




Lesser or equal 
than 45 years old 
Older than 45 years
Trust  1  0.031 -0.028 0.015 -0.008 
  (0.034) (0.043) (0.041) (0.035) 
Trust  2  0.045 0.036 0.050 0.030 
  (0.031) (0.036) (0.036) (0.031) 
Trust  3  0.076** 0.078**  0.106*** 0.053* 
  (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.029) 
Trust  4  0.083*** 0.074** 0.096***  0.047 
  (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.031) 
Trust  5  0.090*** 0.068** 0.092*** 0.064** 
  (0.028) (0.031) (0.031) (0.027) 
Trust  6  0.103*** 0.130*** 0.142*** 0.089*** 
  (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.030) 
Trust  7  0.146*** 0.144*** 0.142*** 0.119*** 
  (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.028) 
Trust  8  0.138*** 0.161*** 0.145*** 0.126*** 
  (0.033) (0.032) (0.034) (0.029) 
Trust 9  0.141***  0.149***  0.113**  0.142*** 
  (0.046) (0.038) (0.044) (0.036) 
Trust  10  0.070 0.071 0.044  0.094** 
  (0.056) (0.048) (0.060) (0.044) 
Observations  11007 17376 14094 14289 
R-squared  0.60 0.59 0.60 0.66 
Notes: [1] Standard errors are clustered at the country level, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%; [2] Trust is the answer to the 
following question: “Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? Please 
tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you can’t be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted”; [3] Column 1 and 2 restrict the 
sample to individuals with education lower than secondary and equal and greater than secondary respectively; columns 3 and 4 restrict the sample to 





Table A2  
Trust or Trustworthiness , and Income 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 
  Log inc  Log inc  Log inc  Log inc  Log inc  Log inc  Log inc  Log inc  Log inc Log  inc Log  inc 
Trust  1  -0.003  0.007  0.001 -0.008 -0.008  -0.013  -0.007 -0.001 -0.003 -0.012 -0.010 
  (0.029)  (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Trust  2  0.038  0.028 0.031 0.035 0.034  0.030  0.035 0.031 0.032 0.029 0.031 
  (0.025)  (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Trust 3  0.080***  0.081*** 0.082*** 0.074*** 0.071*** 0.070*** 0.074*** 0.081*** 0.083*** 0.074*** 0.077*** 
  (0.023)  (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Trust 4  0.083***  0.080*** 0.073*** 0.062**  0.064*** 0.059**  0.065*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.070*** 0.072*** 
  (0.024)  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Trust 5  0.085***  0.085*** 0.085*** 0.065*** 0.066*** 0.063*** 0.067*** 0.078*** 0.077*** 0.072*** 0.076*** 
  (0.022)  (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Trust 6  0.120***  0.120*** 0.118*** 0.102*** 0.106*** 0.100*** 0.106*** 0.119*** 0.116*** 0.111*** 0.116*** 
  (0.024)  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) 
Trust 7  0.139***  0.138*** 0.139*** 0.110*** 0.115*** 0.107*** 0.114*** 0.132*** 0.133*** 0.127*** 0.134*** 
  (0.023)  (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) 
Trust 8  0.142***  0.142*** 0.144*** 0.113*** 0.116*** 0.112*** 0.116*** 0.140*** 0.139*** 0.133*** 0.140*** 
  (0.023)  (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Trust 9  0.136***  0.137*** 0.131*** 0.101*** 0.106*** 0.100*** 0.107*** 0.125*** 0.128*** 0.121*** 0.125*** 
  (0.030)  (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Trust  10  0.075*  0.088**  0.081** 0.057  0.058  0.061  0.062* 0.065* 0.063*  0.056  0.066* 
  (0.038)  (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) 
K e p t   c h a n g e     - 0 . 1 0 6 * * *               
  (0.041)              
K e p t   c h a n g e   s q u a r e d   0 . 0 1 4 * *               
  (0.006)              
Avoid  tax    -0.017             
    (0.024)             
Avoid  tax  squared    -0.003             
    (0.003)             
Sold  something,  fault  concealed      0.005            
      (0.084)            
Sold  something,  fault  concealed  sq.      -0.008            
      (0.011)            
                7 
 
Trustworthiness       0.009***          
       (0.002)           
Trustworthiness  squared       -0.000           
       (0.000)           
Choose  pace  of  work        0.017***        
        (0.005)         
Choose  pace  of  work  squared        -0.000         
        (0.000)         
Influence  policy  decisions         0.029***       
         (0.004)       
Influence  policy  decisions  squared         -0.001***       
         (0.000)       
Decide  daily  work           0.019***     
           (0.005)      
Decide  daily  work  squared           -0.000      
           (0.000)      
Falsely  claim  govern.  benefits             -0.305*     
             (0.183)     
Falsely  claim  govern.  benefits             0.038     
             (0.024)     
Offered bribe to public official                  0.149     
              (0.108)    
Offered bribe to public official sq.                  -0.029*     
              (0.015)    
False  insurance  claim               -0.265*   
               (0.161)   
False  insurance  claim  squared               0.023   
               (0.020)   
Pretend  eligible  for  benefits                -0.097 
                (0.109) 
Pretend eligible  for benefits sq.                      0.008 
                (0.015) 
Observations  25881  25547 25505 25023 25211  25101  25259 26022 26064 25785 25974 
R-squared  0.61  0.61 0.61 0.62 0.62  0.62  0.62 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 
Notes: [1] The specification follows the main specification of Table 2; the various measures of trustworthiness are defined in the text [2] Standard errors 




Trust and Income, Robustness to Additional Controls 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Log inc  Log inc  Log inc  Log inc  Log inc 
Trust  1  0.008 0.001 0.023 0.006 0.030 
  (0.025) (0.027) (0.032) (0.027) (0.029) 
Trust 2  0.039*  0.038  0.059**  0.051**  0.065** 
  (0.022) (0.024) (0.028) (0.023) (0.025) 
Trust 3   0.073***  0.078***  0.082*** 0.087*** 0.077*** 
  (0.021) (0.022) (0.026) (0.022) (0.024) 
Trust 4  0.075***  0.077***  0.063**  0.085***  0.049** 
  (0.021) (0.023) (0.027) (0.023) (0.024) 
Trust 5  0.076***  0.078***  0.077*** 0.088*** 0.071*** 
  (0.019) (0.021) (0.024) (0.020) (0.022) 
Trust 6  0.110***  0.120***  0.120*** 0.130*** 0.099*** 
  (0.021) (0.022) (0.026) (0.022) (0.024) 
Trust 7  0.129***  0.135***  0.138*** 0.143*** 0.121*** 
  (0.020) (0.021) (0.025) (0.021) (0.023) 
Trust 8  0.136***  0.137***  0.128*** 0.145*** 0.113*** 
  (0.021) (0.022) (0.026) (0.022) (0.024) 
Trust  9  0.122*** 0.133*** 0.099*** 0.128***  0.074** 
  (0.028) (0.028) (0.032) (0.028) (0.031) 
Trust 10  0.065**  0.070*  0.064  0.080**  0.043 
  (0.033) (0.037) (0.043) (0.036) (0.037) 
Risk  aversion  0.014*** 0.015*** 0.012*** 0.017*** 0.013*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Age 0.003**  0.004**  0.033***  0.009***  0.031*** 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Age  squared  -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male  0.040***  0.040*** -0.004 0.037***  -0.016* 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) 
Immigrant  -0.166*** -0.159*** -0.132*** -0.163*** -0.139*** 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.016) (0.018) 
Married 0.403***  0.405***  0.007  0.284***  -0.005 
  (0.011) (0.012) (0.025) (0.012) (0.024) 
       9 
 
Single  0.115***  0.114*** -0.022 0.140*** 0.014 
  (0.015) (0.016) (0.029) (0.015) (0.029) 
Unemployed    -0.488*** -0.500*** -0.508*** -0.517*** -0.498*** 
  (0.019) (0.022) (0.027) (0.021) (0.024) 
Out of the labor force  -0.157***  -0.169***  -0.147***  -0.180***  -0.145*** 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) 
Big city  0.057***  0.072***  0.099*** 0.111*** 0.098*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) 
Small city  0.030***  0.038*** 0.054*** 0.066*** 0.052*** 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) 
Primary  education   -0.473***  -0.382***  -0.502***  
    (0.016) (0.019) (0.015)   
Secondary  education   -0.257***  -0.214***  -0.268***  
    (0.011) (0.012) (0.010)   
Father primary education  -0.139***  -0.127*** -0.066*** -0.162***  -0.037* 
  (0.016) (0.019) (0.018) (0.016) (0.021) 
Father secondary education  -0.052***  -0.051*** -0.014 -0.060*** -0.014 
  (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.018) 
Mother primary education    -0.059**      -0.009 
   (0.023)    (0.026) 
Mother secondary education    -0.010      0.022 
   (0.021)    (0.023) 
Partner  primary  education     -0.405***  -0.370*** 
     (0.019)  (0.020) 
Partner secondary education      -0.205***    -0.193*** 
     (0.012)  (0.013) 
Number of people living at home        0.124***  0.049*** 
      (0.004)  (0.004) 
Education dummies*country dummies  yes  no  no  no  yes 
Observations  28383 27913 17858 28380 17568 
R-squared  0.63 0.62 0.68 0.64 0.69 
Notes: [1] Each regression controls for country, region fixed effects; [2] Standard errors are clustered at the country level, *** significant at 1%, ** 
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%; [3] Trust is the answer to the following question: “Generally speaking would you say that most people can be 
trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you can’t be too careful and 10 
means that most people can be trusted”. [4] The excluded group for education and father education are people with college or more; the excluded 
group for marital status are divorced or widows; the excluded group for labor status are people employed; the excluded group for city size are people 
living in a country village, a farm or a home in the countryside. 10 
 
Table A4 
Trust and Cheating, OLS Regressions 


















Trust -0.020  -0.016  -0.025  -0.029  -0.088  -0.046 
 (0.003)***  (0.002)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.009)*** (0.004)*** 
Age 0.018  -0.006  0.017  0.013  0.040  0.019 
 (0.002)***  (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.007)*** (0.003)*** 
Age squared  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.001  -0.000 
 (0.000)***  (0.000)  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Male 0.134  0.096  -0.148  0.130  0.244  0.165 
 (0.013)***  (0.011)*** (0.020)*** (0.015)*** (0.042)*** (0.021)*** 
Immigrant 0.005  0.039  -0.007  0.036  0.058  0.034 
 (0.023)  (0.020)*  (0.034)  (0.027)  (0.074)  (0.037) 
Married -0.004  -0.013  0.018  -0.069  -0.055  -0.032 
 (0.016)  (0.014)  (0.026)  (0.019)*** (0.053)  (0.026) 
Single -0.109  0.002  -0.100  -0.142  -0.335  -0.168 
 (0.022)***  (0.019)  (0.033)*** (0.024)*** (0.069)*** (0.035)*** 
Primary -0.123  -0.000  -0.142  -0.111  -0.342  -0.170 
 (0.025)***  (0.022)  (0.039)*** (0.029)*** (0.080)*** (0.040)*** 
Secondary -0.065  0.017  -0.104  -0.085  -0.225  -0.105 
 (0.020)***  (0.016)  (0.029)*** (0.021)*** (0.059)*** (0.030)*** 
Father primary  -0.101  -0.071  -0.133  -0.168  -0.482  -0.244 
 (0.026)***  (0.021)*** (0.038)*** (0.028)*** (0.078)*** (0.039)*** 
Father secondary  -0.085  -0.050  -0.121  -0.114  -0.363  -0.185 
 (0.023)***  (0.019)*** (0.034)*** (0.025)*** (0.070)*** (0.035)*** 
Unemployed 0.020  0.038  0.073  0.015  0.111  0.051 
 (0.029)  (0.027)  (0.044)*  (0.032)  (0.091)  (0.046) 
Out of labor force  0.012  0.016  0.122  0.025  0.174  0.075 
 (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.022)*** (0.016)  (0.046)*** (0.023)*** 
Risk aversion  0.027  0.016  -0.003  0.022  0.061  0.035 
 (0.005)***  (0.004)*** (0.007)  (0.005)*** (0.015)*** (0.007)*** 
Log income  0.044  -0.011  0.043  0.048  0.120  0.058 
 (0.009)***  (0.008)  (0.014)*** (0.011)*** (0.029)*** (0.014)*** 11 
 
Big city  0.022  0.001  0.152  0.064  0.294  0.133 
 (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.026)*** (0.019)*** (0.052)*** (0.026)*** 
Small city  0.016  0.028  0.095  0.048  0.191  0.091 
 (0.015)  (0.013)**  (0.023)*** (0.016)*** (0.047)*** (0.024)*** 
Observations 21616  23138  23592  22961  20190  20190 
R-squared 0.10  0.10  0.13  0.08  0.15  0.14 
Notes: [1] Each regression controls for country, region fixed effects and 8 occupational dummies; [2] 
Standard errors are clustered at the country level, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant 
at 10%.; [3] Trust is the answer to the following question: “Generally speaking would you say that most 
people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 
0 to 10, where 0 means you can’t be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted”; [4] The 
cheating variables are the answer to the following questions: “how often, if ever, have each of these 
things happened to you in the last five years? A bank or insurance company failed to offer you the best 
deal you were entitled to; you were sold something second-hand that quickly proved to be faulty; you 
were sold food that was packed to conceal the worse bits; A plumber, builder, car mechanic or other 
repair person overcharged you or did unnecessary work” The answer could take values Never (1), once 
(2), twice (3), 3 or 4 time (4) 5 times or more (5); [5] The excluded group for education and father 
education are people with college or more; the excluded group for marital status are divorced or widows; 
the excluded group for labor status are people employed; the excluded group for city size are people 



















Trust and Cheating, Reduced Forms Regressions 


















Trustworthiness 0.007***  0.002***  0.005*** 0.005*** 0.020*** 0.010*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Age 0.016***  -0.006*** 0.017*** 0.012*** 0.035*** 0.017*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) 
Age squared  -0.000***  -0.000  -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male 0.122***  0.092***  -0.163*** 0.121*** 0.197*** 0.141*** 
  (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.021) (0.015) (0.043) (0.021) 
Immigrant  0.018  0.043**  0.001 0.038 0.088 0.050 
  (0.023)  (0.021)  (0.035) (0.027) (0.075) (0.038) 
Married -0.007  -0.014  0.009  -0.067***  -0.068  -0.038 
  (0.017)  (0.014)  (0.026) (0.019) (0.053) (0.027) 
Single -0.109***  0.002  -0.105*** -0.139*** -0.333*** -0.166*** 
  (0.022)  (0.019)  (0.034) (0.025) (0.070) (0.035) 
Primary -0.111***  0.011  -0.129*** -0.093*** -0.287*** -0.141*** 
  (0.026)  (0.022)  (0.040) (0.029) (0.081) (0.041) 
Secondary -0.059***  0.024  -0.094*** -0.074*** -0.190*** -0.087*** 
  (0.020)  (0.016)  (0.029) (0.021) (0.060) (0.030) 
Father primary  -0.073***  -0.061*** -0.111*** -0.140***  -0.399*** -0.200*** 
  (0.026)  (0.021)  (0.038) (0.028) (0.078) (0.039) 
Father secondary  -0.068***  -0.045**  -0.117*** -0.099*** -0.321*** -0.162*** 
  (0.023)  (0.019)  (0.034) (0.025) (0.070) (0.035) 
Unemployed  0.048*  0.051*  0.094** 0.036 0.191**  0.093** 
  (0.029)  (0.028)  (0.044) (0.033) (0.092) (0.046) 
Out of labor force  0.023  0.019  0.127***  0.030*  0.202***  0.090*** 
  (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.023) (0.016) (0.046) (0.023) 
Risk aversion  0.024***  0.015***  -0.005  0.020***  0.054***  0.032*** 
  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.007) (0.005) (0.015) (0.008) 
Log income  0.035***  -0.011  0.035** 0.040***  0.091*** 0.044*** 
  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.014) (0.011) (0.029) (0.015) 13 
 
Big  city  0.027  0.005  0.151*** 0.063*** 0.299*** 0.136*** 
  (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.026) (0.019) (0.053) (0.026) 
Small  city  0.018  0.031** 0.101*** 0.052*** 0.202*** 0.097*** 
  (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.023) (0.017) (0.048) (0.024) 
Observations  21191  22667  23094 22495 19796 19796 
R-squared  0.10  0.10  0.13 0.08 0.14 0.14 
Notes: [1] Each regression controls for country, region fixed effects and 8 occupational dummies; [2] 
Standard errors are clustered at the country level, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant 
at 10%; [3] Trust is the answer to the following question: “Generally speaking would you say that most 
people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 
0 to 10, where 0 means you can’t be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted”; 
Trustworthiness is the sum of the following three questions: “I am going to read out a list of things about 
your working life. Using this card, please say how much the management at your work allows/allowed 
you to 1) decide how your own daily work is/was organized; 2) influence policy decisions about the 
activities of the organization? 3) to choose or change your pace of work?” The answer to each question 
can take values from I have/had no influence (0) to I have had complete control (10); [4] The cheating 
variables are the answer to the following questions: “how often, if ever, have each of these things 
happened to you in the last five years? A bank or insurance company failed to offer you the best deal you 
were entitled to; you were sold something second-hand that quickly proved to be faulty; you were sold 
food that was packed to conceal the worse bits; A plumber, builder, car mechanic or other repair person 
overcharged you or did unnecessary work” The answer could take values Never (1), once (2), twice (3), 3 
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